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Preface
This study began in 2004, two years after the Canada Safeway Strike had 
concluded. At the time of the strike, I was completing my undergraduate degree in 
Education at Lakehead University. During my placement at one of the local elementary 
schools in November, I witnessed United Food and Commercial Worker (UFCW) 
members walking the picket line in front of Canada Safeway. Like many people in the 
Thunder Bay community, I was not completely aware of the issues surrounding the 
strike. I could only imagine how difficult it was for the members walking the picket line 
during the winter months. With these thoughts in mind I began to research the Canada 
Safeway Strike in Thunder Bay. I believed it was a clear cut case: Canada Safeway was 
the aggressor and the UFCW was defending the rights of its members. The world is not 
black and white, however, and while evidence showed that Canada Safeway adopted an 
aggressive policy, it also demonstrated at times how the UFCW had represented its 
members poorly.
Two local newspapers. The Chronicle Journal and the Thunder Bay Post provided 
substantial coverage of the strike. Besides clarifying some basic facts, the editorials and 
letters to the editor provided feedback from the community and members of Local 175 of 
the UFCW. Efforts to enlist the help of the UFCW and Canada Safeway proved 
disappointing, as each side contended that it was looking to move on since the strike 
ended. Both refused to participate in the study. The UFCW history of the Canada 
Safeway Strike in Thunder Bay, newspaper articles, and interviews with UFCW members 
provided plenty of evidence on the Canada Safeway strike. For many of the employees
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and ex-employees at Canada Safeway, the strike was still very fresh in their minds; this 
included the feelings of bitterness, shame, anger, disappointment, and joy they all felt 
towards each other while on the picket line. Those people I contacted nevertheless 
remained fearful the company and union would find out about their participation and 
would retaliate against them. The subjects whom I interviewed thus remain confidential, 
unless they gave me explicit permission to use their name.
While the interviews followed specific questions, neither the interviewees nor I 
were tied to them, as I allowed each interview to follow its own path. Some interviews 
lasted only forty-five minutes, but on the whole those I interviewed spent hours 
discussing the strike. The interviews conducted during this thesis provided information 
that could never be found in a newspaper, book or other written record. For this reason, I 
would like to thank those with whom I conducted interviews; if they had not participated 
in my thesis, I would never have been able to provide the personal accounts that make 
this history so intriguing.
Besides those courageous people who participated in the interview process, I 
would like to thank Professor Marina Robinson, who in my early undergraduate career 
agreed to teach me a reading course in Canadian Labour History; besides providing 
valuable insights into labour history, she encouraged me to develop my skills as a writer. 
Similarly, I could not have improved my writing skills without the help of Dr. Ernest 
Zimmermann and my thesis advisor, Bruce Strang, both of whom were tireless in their 
efforts to take a mediocre writer and push him to finish the thesis you see before you. 
Thanks also must extend to the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of 
Canada (SSHRC) which provided much-appreciated financial support to complete this
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Ill
thesis in the last year of my Master’s thesis. Most importantly, thanks goes out to my 
wife Bolpar, who for the last two years has heard my constant ramblings about the 
Canada Safeway strike and who has always supported me in my efforts, financially and 
emotionally. It is also with great pride that I thank my first-born son, Maximus, for kick- 
starting my day early every morning.
William Vinh-Doyle
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Introduction
Located in Northwestern Ontario, beside Lake Superior and the Kaministqua River, the 
cities of Fort William and Port Arthur remain geographically isolated from the industrial centers 
of central Ontario and the farming communities in the Prairie Provinces. The cities’ access to rail 
and sea transportation nevertheless proved useful, as Fort William and Port Arthur became the 
conduit connecting Eastern and Western Canada. The introduction of the railroad in 1875 led to 
the development of the region’s first major industry in lumber and later mining. The railway was 
also responsible for bringing grain from Western Canada to the ports of Fort William and Port 
Arthur, which was eventually shipped to various European countries. By 1929, the world’s 
largest grain elevator, Saskatchewan Pool No. 7, had been built in Fort William.*
The abundance of natural resources led to other resource based jobs, including jobs in the 
pulp and paper and mining industries. Pulp and paper played a significant role in expanding the 
region, as it became the leading manufacturing industry in Northwestern Ontario and Canada by 
the end of the 1920s. The notable exception to the region’s resource industry was the Can-Car 
plant, which built small single-engine aircraft, including the Hurricane fighter and Curtiss 
Helldivers, during the Second World War. By the end of the war, growth in the service sector, 
education, health, and business services led to increased job opportunities in the region. These 
jobs, however, did not slow the decline of Thunder Bay’s labour market, as the resource 
economy suffered job losses through lay offs and plant shutdowns.^
Ethnic ties proved useful socially, economically, and politically during the early 
twentieth century, as workers faced off against employers and the government in their struggle to
’ James Stafford, “A  Century o f  Growth at the Lakehead,” Thunder Bay From Rivalry to Unity, ed. Tonrud and Epp 
(Thunder Bay: The Thunder Bay Historical Museum Society, Inc., 1995), 39-42.
 ̂Ibid; 48-53.
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improve their living and working conditions and to receive union recognition. The Finnish 
Organization of Canada and the Ukrainian Labour Temple were instrumental in supporting the 
more militant unions, such as the Industrial Workers of the World (IWW) and the Workers’
Unity League (WUL), in organizing the lumber workers during the 1920s.^ Ethnic bonds, 
however, also had the negative effect of dividing the community, as employers often played one 
nationality against another in an attempt “to defeat strikes and block unionization.”'* The 
Canadian Pacific Railroad, for example, replaced its Greek and Italian workers in 1906 with 
British-born workers. The following year, after engaging in strike activity themselves, the British 
workers were similarly replaced by Greeks and Italians.^ The irregular pattern of working-class 
success before the Second World War left unions relatively weak and vulnerable to employers 
and government.
The economic boom of the Second World War led to new challenges for the working- 
class, as unions and workers rallied to the cause of the war by agreeing not to strike.
Nevertheless, a shortage of labour provided new opportunities for workers, enabling them to 
demand better working and living conditions, including an increase in pay and union recognition. 
Three strikes by freight handlers in Thunder Bay against the National War Labour Board during 
1943, for example, were resolved by compromise but led to improved wages.® Government 
legislation in 1944 to appease workers followed a wave of worker militancy from 1941 to 1943. 
Bill PC 1003 “established the right of employees to belong to trade unions, which in turn were 
empowered to elect or appoint representatives to bargain with bosses as long as those
 ̂ Ibid; 132. For a more detailed examination o f Northern Ontario’s logging industry see Ian Radforth, Bush workers 
and Bosses: Logging in Northern Ontario 1900-1980. (Toronto: University o f Toronto Press, 1987).
Jean Morrison, “The Organization o f Labour at Thunder Bay,” Thunder Bay From Rivalry to Unity, ed. Tonrud 
and Epp (Thunder Bay: The Thunder Bay Historical Museum Society, Inc., 1995), 126.
 ̂Ibid. See also Joseph M. Mauro, The Gold Gateway o f the Great Northwest A History o f  Thunder Bay, (Thunder 
Bay: Lehto Printers Ltd. 1981), 230.
® Morrison, “The Organization o f Labour at Thunder Bay,” 137.
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representatives had the support of a majority of workers in their jurisdiction.”  ̂While viewed as a 
milestone in Canadian labour history, the enactment of PC 1001 was the beginning of a broader 
trend towards the institutionalization of the labour movement in Canada. Following PC 1001 in 
1944, Justice Ivan Rand, an arbitrator appointed by the Federal Government to end the Ford 
Windsor strike in 1945, extended union rights by awarding the union a checkoff system, which 
guaranteed unions in Canada stable union dues. “The Supreme Court judge believed that by 
giving the union a firm financial basis on which to grow, it would mature and become a 
responsible entity.”* While it appeared that unions in Canada had made substantial gains during 
the war years, the beginnings of the Cold War led employers, government, and conservative 
trade union members to eject labour’s most radical “Communist” elements, denying the labour 
movement some of its most able leaders.^ The Port Arthur Labour Council, for example, 
expelled three “Red delegates for having supported a resolution calling for seating of Communist 
China in the United Nations, withdrawal of all troops from Korea, and recognition by Canada of 
Red China.”*® Such attacks against “Reds” weakened the labour movement, reducing the 
militancy of unions.** The decline of labour militancy was especially difficult for unions in 
Northwestern Ontario as membership in industrial unions declined “under the impact of 
mechanization, automation, falling markets, and changing transportation routes.” *̂
’ Bryan Palmer, Working Class Experience: Rethinking the H istory o f Canadian Labour, 1800-1991, (Toronto: 
McClelland & Stewart Inc.), 280.
® David Moulton, “Ford Windsor 1945,” On Strike Six Key Labour Struggles in Canada 1919-1949. ed. Irving 
Abella (Toronto: James Lorimer & Company, Publishers, 1975), 148.
 ̂Morrison, “The Organization of Labour at Thunder Bay,” 138.
'°Ibid, 138.
" For a more detailed account see Irving Abella. Nationalism. Communism, and Canadian Labour: the CIO, the 
Communist Party, and the Canadian Congress o f Labour. 1935-1956. (Toronto: Toronto University Press, 1973).
Morrison, “The Organization o f Labour at Thunder Bay,” 138. James Stafford contended that “the number o f  
workers in the manufacturing sector declined drastically, despite the success o f Bombardier in producing 
transportation equipment. The loss o f jobs in the pulp and paper industry was a major factor in this decline. Another 
area which saw significant job losses was the transportation sector, where the decline in importance o f  the St. 
Lawrence Seaway and rail transportation to the east led to the elimination o f 2,000 jobs.” James Stafford, “A  
Century o f  Growth at the Lakehead,” 53.
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The decline of full-time permanent union positions in manufacturing and transportation 
has been offset by the growth of jobs in the public sector, particularly jobs in health, education, 
and services, which have been primarily filled by w o m en .U n ions experienced an increase in 
membership between 1960 and 1980, coinciding with an increase in public sector employment. 
Throughout this period, public employees began to assert their rights to receive union 
recognition, pay equity, and improved wages, leading to increased working-class militancy and 
working-class feminism in the labour movement.*'*
Growth in the public sector was just one shift in the employment sector. Another, shift in 
employment was the growth of part-time, in lieu of full-time, job opportunities in the private 
retail sector. The construction of the Intercity Shopping Centre, Rio Can Centre, and, more 
recently, the Thunder Centre, has created a number of new retail jobs as companies such as Old 
Navy, Home Depot, and Home Sense have opened locations in Thunder Bay. In addition to 
clothing, furniture, and other home decor stores, the city has seen the rise of a number of grocery 
stores since the 1980s. The most notable example is the Real Canadian Superstore, built during 
the early 1990s and expanded during the Canada Safeway strike. Other locally owned grocery 
stores, such as Renco Foods and Quality Market, continue to provide a smaller, more personal 
shopping experience. Still other non-unionized stores, including Wal-Mart, have expanded their 
food sections, selling not only canned goods but also a variety of frozen foods and dairy 
products.
The increase in the number of part-time positions in the retail sector, especially in 
grocery stores, has created challenges for older unionized companies such as the Atlantic and 
Pacific Company (A&P) and Canada Safeway, who have retained their full-time permanent
Ibid; 53.
M eg Luxton, “Feminism as a Class Act: Working-Class Feminism and the W omen’s Movement in Canada," 
Labour/Le Travail. Vol. 48 (Fall 2001): 68.
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employees. While these companies have responded to the labour trend by introducing loyalty 
programs, such as offering Air Miles rewards or similar reward point systems to attract 
customers, they have also attempted to achieve a more flexible labour force. An increase in the 
number of part-time employees and the reduction of full-time staff and the industry’s attempts to 
limit employee wages and benefit packages are just a few examples of how companies have 
responded to this competition. The union representing most grocery employees, the United Food 
and Commercial Workers (UFCW), struggled to maintain a full-time workforce with little 
success, just as it struggled to preserve employee wages and benefits. Nevertheless, the UFCW 
leadership continues to try to make inroads into companies such as Wal-Mart, which remains 
almost entirely union free.
Geographically isolated from other Canada Safeway stores in Western Canada, the three 
stores in Thunder Bay provided an opportunity for the company to introduce pre-packaged meats 
as a cost saving measure during contract negotiations in September 2001, which would have 
resulted in the loss of over thirty full and part-time jobs. Agreeing to strike against the company 
on October 1, company employees were faced with a tough battle, with little or no assistance 
from other stores in the region, located in Fort Frances, Dryden and Kenora. Failing to reach an 
agreement by June 2002, Canada Safeway closed its stores in Thunder Bay and fired 
approximately 425 employees. Canada Safeway employees continued to picket, hoping for a 
resolution and a re-vote on the company’s last offer. Pending another vote, however, other union 
members attempted to decertify the UFCW and to charter their own union, the Safeway 
Workers’ Association. The Ontario Labour Relations Board refused to order a re-vote on the 
company’s last offer and denied Canada Safeway employees the right to decertify the UFCW. 
Shortly thereafter, the UFCW and Canada Safeway agreed on a new contract, with the majority
R eproduced  with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission.
of workers voting in its favor. The Canada Safeway strike lasted a year and a half, by which time 
many Canada Safeway employees had found other jobs and the company had won further 
concessions.
The Canada Safeway strike provides new incentive to study working class history. The 
historiography of the working class has changed considerably over the course of the twentieth 
century. The traditional approach to working class history, which was epitomized in the work of 
Harold Logan’s Trade Unions in Canada, focused on the political and institutional activities of 
the union and employer.*® During the 1960s and 1970s, however, social upheavals in Europe and 
America, characterized by industrial unrest, an awareness of black civil rights, and a demand to 
recognize the equal rights of women, compelled university graduates and scholars to 
revolutionize the writing of history to reflect the changing social and cultural milieu of the times. 
Those historians who analyzed labour history began to stress the social experiences reflected by 
the workers. In Britain, E.P. Thompson placed particular emphasis on the culture of the working- 
classrand class consciousness. He argued the characteristics of working-class life were 
“embodied in traditions, value-systems, ideas, and institutional forms.”*® This view was similar 
to the perspective in the United States, where labour historians such as Herbert Gutman 
emphasized the new “American radical history.” *̂  American scholars adopted a bottom-up 
approach to historical writing, but concentrated less on “working-class culture as a factor 
unifying the working class,” acknowledging instead a variety o f ethnic origins.**
Harold Logan, Trade Unions in Canada: their development and functioning (Toronto: MacMillan Co. o f  Canada, 
1948).
E.P. Thompson, The Making of the English Working Class, (London: Penguin Books, 1991), 9.
Kenneth McNaught, “E.P. Thompson vs. Harold Logan: Writing about Labour and the Left in the 1970s,” The 
Canadian Historical Review (1981): 143.
David Bercuson, “Through the Looking Glass o f Culture: An Essay on the New  Labour History and Working- 
Class culture in recent Canadian Historical Writing,” Labour/Le Travail (1981): 98.
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Canadian historians, similarly disillusioned by older approaches to historical writing, 
were also influenced by a variety of challenges directed against the political establishment in 
Canada. A new wave of nationalism in Quebec, the rise of nationalism in Canada directed 
against American interests, and a resurgence of working-class militancy throughout Canada led 
to increasing calls for broader political, economic, and social responsibility.*^ Canadian scholars 
attempted to produce a history that more closely resembled the shifting social, cultural, and 
political milieu throughout Canada. They were particularly attracted to the “British depiction of a 
working-class culture underlying the changing expression of class consciousness and buttressing 
resistance to the discipline of industrial capitalism.” ®̂ These social historians both recognized the 
need to deal with labour history in a new way and sought to embody their goals in the 
establishment of a new organization, the Committee on Canadian Labour History (CCLH).^* The 
CCLH published a broad range of articles in the semi-annual journal, Labour/Le Travail, that 
gave emphasis to “the social-cultural aspects of working-class history, and to varieties of Marxist 
interpretation,” whilst it maintained the importance of institutional labour history.^^
Within the organization, however, two distinct groups emerged; the first group favoured a 
cultural approach to historical writing. It focused on the “beliefs, values and traditions of the 
workers.” ®̂ Gregory Kealey, Laurel Sefton MacDowell, and other scholars found that workers 
developed a sense of working-class consciousness despite social division, antagonism and 
struggle.^'* Others, such as Peter DeLottonville, Bonita Bray, and Suzanne Morton, extended the
Gregory Kealey, Workers and Canadian History (Kingston: McGill-Queens University Press, 1995), 17. 
McNaught, McNaught, “E.P. Thompson vs. Harold Logan: Writing about Labour and the Left in the 1970s,” 143. 
Ibid; 144.
“ ibid, 145.
“  David Bercuson, “Through the Looking Glass o f  Culture: An Essay on the New Labour History and Working- 
Class culture in recent Canadian Historical Writing,” 97.
See the following articles: Gregory S. Kealey, “The Honest Workingman and Workers’ Control: The Experience 
of Toronto Skilled Workers, 1860-1892,” Labour/Le Travail (1976): 32-68. Laurel Sefton M acDowell, “The
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concept of working class culture, examining it outside the confines of the union to include 
community life.^®
A second group of scholars challenged the unity of class culture, emphasizing instead the 
importance of gender, regionalism, and ethnicity in unifying the working classes. Historians who 
focused on gender issues, such as Susan Trofimenkoff, Mercedes Steedman, Anne Porter,
Bettina Bradbury, and Graham Lowe, argued males and females articulated the world differently, 
setting them apart from one another.^® Other historians, such as Ross McCormack and David 
Bercuson, contributed to labour history by focusing on regional disparities, arguing workers in 
Western Canada were more radical. Still others, such as Agnes Calliste, Ian Radforth, and John 
Lutz, concluded workers often unite against an employer based on their ethnic heritage, as their 
past traditions help nourished their resistance to capitalism even though they undercut notions of 
class cohesion.
Formation o f the Canadian Industrial Relations System During World War Two,” Labour/Le Travail (1978): 175- 
196.
See the following articles: Peter DeLottinville, “Joe B eef o f  Montreal: Working-Class Culture and the Tavern, 
1869-1889,” Labour/Le Travailleur (1981-1982): 9-40. Bonita Bray, “Against All Odds: The Progressive Arts 
Club’s Production o f Waiting for Lefty,” Canadian Working Class History Selected Reading 2"** Ed. ed. M acDowell 
& Radforth (Toronto: Canadian Scholars Press, 2000), 489-522. Suzanne Morton, “The June Bride as the Working- 
Class Bride: Getting Married in a Halifax Working-Class Neighbourhood in the 1920s,” Canadian Working Class 
History Selected Reading 2"** Ed. ed. M acDowell & Radforth (Toronto: Canadian Scholars Press, 2000), 408-425.
^  See the following articles: Susan Tofimenkoff, “One Hundred and Two Muffled Voices: Canada’s Industrial 
Women in the 1880s,” Canadian Working Class History Selected Reading 2"'̂  Ed. ed. M acDowell & Radforth, 
(Toronto: Canadian Scholars Press, 2000), 143-155. Mercedes Steedman, “Skill and Gender in the Canadian 
Clothing Industry, 1890-1940,” Canadian Working Class History Selected Reading 2"‘* Ed. ed. M acDowell & 
Radforth (Toronto: Canadian Scholars Press, 2000), 450-470. Anne Porter, “Women and Income Security in the 
Post-Ware Period: The Case o f Unemployment Insurance, 1945-1962,” Labour/Le Travail. 31 (Spring 1993), 111- 
144. Bettina Bradbury, “Gender at Work at Home: Family Relations, the Labour Market, and Girls’ Contributions to 
the Family Economy,” Canadian Working Class History Selected Reading 2"*̂  Ed. ed. M acDowell & Radforth 
(Toronto: Canadian Scholars Press, 2000), 215-234. Graham S. Lowe, “Class, Job and Gender in the Canadian 
Office.” Labour/Le Travailleur (1982). 11-38.
“  See the following: Ross McCormack, Reformers. Rebels, and Revolutionaries: The Western Canadian Radical 
Movement. 1899-1919 (Toronto: University o f  Toronto Press, 1977). David Bercuson, Fools and W ise Men: The 
Rise and Fall o f the One Big Union (Toronto: McGraw-Hill Ryerson Limited, 1978). David Bercuson,
Confrontation at Winnipeg: Labour, Industrial Relations and the General Strike (Montreal: M cGill-Queen’s 
University Press, 1974). Agnes Calliste, “Sleeping Car Porters in Canada: An Ethnically Submerged Split Labour 
Market,” Canadian Working Class History Selected Reading 2"*̂  Ed. ed. M acDowell & Radforth (Toronto: Canadian 
Scholars Press, 2000), 596-617. Ian Radforth, “Finnish Radicalims and Labour Activism in the Northern Ontario 
W oods,” Canadian Working Class History Selected Reading 2"̂  Ed. ed. M acDowell & Radforth, (Toronto:
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With the increasing stress on analysis of gender, regionalism, and ethnicity, such cultural 
historians, as Ruth Bleasdale and Franca lacovetta examined these issues and concluded that 
class played a more dominant role/* Others, such as Irving Abella, have examined the 
relationship between violence or the threat of violence in some of Canada’s most successful 
labour struggles/® Still others, including James Struthers, Laurel Sefton MacDowell, Jeremy 
Webber, and H.M. Grant, have continued to examine politics and institutions/®
Among these historians, only a few attempted to examine the post-1980s, preferring to 
write about Canada’s more distant past. Those who added to the historiography included 
prominent trade union leaders such as Bob White, President of the Canadian Auto Workers 
(CAW) in 1980, and Jack Munro, leader of the International Woodworkers of American (IWA) 
in 1973. Bob White’s autobiography. Hard Bargains: My Life on the Line, recounts the 
nationalistic feelings of the Canadian auto workers in their pursuit of independence from the 
United Automobile Workers (UAW) in 1985, and the willingness of the UAW to make 
concessions with the automakers.** Diverging from Bob White’s nationalistic sentiments. Jack 
Munro’s autobiography. Union Jack: Labour Leader Jack Munro, demonstrated the divisions 
that afflicted union leaders and the rank and file membership in 1983, as Art Kube, President of
Canadian Scholars Press, 2000), 471-488. John Lutz, “After the Fur Trade: The Aboriginal Labouring Class o f  
British Columbia 1849-1890,” Canadian Working class History Selected Reading 2"̂  Ed. ed. M acDowell &
Radforth (Toronto: Canadian Scholars Press, 2000), 235-261.
“  See the following articles: Ruth Bleasdale, “Class Conflict on the Canals o f Upper Canada in the 1840s,” 
Labour/Le Travail (1981): 9-39. Franca lacovetta, “From Contadina to Worker: Southern Italian Immigrant Working 
Women in Toronto, 1947-1962,” Canadian Working Class History Selected Reading 2*“* Ed. ed. M acDowell & 
Radforth, (Toronto: Canadian Scholars Press, 2000), 620-640.
“  Irving Abella, ed. On Strike: Six Key Labour Struggles in Canada 1919-1949 (Toronto: James Lorimer & 
Company, Publishers, 1975).
^  James Struthers, N o Fault o f Their Own: Unemployment and the Canadian Welfare State 1914-1941 (Toronto: 
University o f Toronto Press, 1990). Laurel Sefton M acDowell, “After the strike -  Labour Relations in Oshawa, 
1937-1939,” Canadian Working Class History Selected Reading 2*“* Ed. ed. MacDowell & Radforth, (Toronto: 
Canadian Scholars Press, 2000), 505-523. Jeremy Webber, “Compelling Compromise: Canada Chooses Conciliation  
over Arbitration,” Labour/Le Travail Vol. 28 (Fall 1991): 15-57. H.M. Grant, “Solving the Labour Problem at 
Imperial Oil: Welfare Capitalism in the Canadian Petroleum Industry, 1919-1929.” Labour/Le Travail V ol. 41 
(Spring 1998): 69-95.
Bob White, Hard Bargains: mv life on the line. (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1987).
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the British Columbia Federation of Labour, began Operation Solidarity in “opposition to Social 
Credit Premier William Bennett’s economic restraint program.”** Munro was just one labour 
leader, for example, who criticized Art Kube for his decision to push the working class into a 
strike over wider social issues, risking the workers jobs.**
The trend in Canadian historiography to examine Canada’s trade union leadership 
continued throughout the 1980s, as Pradeep Kumar and Dennis Ryan interviewed twelve of 
Canada’s top union leaders. Their research, published by the Industrial Relations Centre at 
Queen’s University, responded to the “debate on whether unions in Canada, like their 
counterparts in the United States, [were] becoming a passing phenomenon.”*'* The interviews 
demonstrated a wide variety of trends in Canada’s labour movement, including ways in which 
the unions had responded to a decline in union membership, their pursuit in “forging closer links 
with other social groups and community organizations,”*® and their battle to maintain job 
security by seeking “no layoff provisions, longer notices on plant closing and technological 
changes, guarantees against contracting out of work and the use of part-time and contract 
workers, employer-sponsored training and retraining, improved pensions, better severance pay 
and other income security clauses.”*® Kumar and Ryan also revealed the divisions within the 
labour movement, as unions raided independents or affiliates of rival unions to increase their 
own union membership. During interviews, union leaders revealed the dissatisfaction of the rank 
and file membership over the unions’ bargaining performance.**
“  Jack Munro, Union Jack Labour Leader Jack Munro. (Vancouver: Douglas & McIntyre, 1988), p. 2.
Ibid.
Pradeep Kumar and Dennis Ryan, “Canadian Union Movement in the 1980s: Perspectives from Union Leaders,” 
Research and Current Issues. No. 53 (Kingston: Industrial Relations Centre, 1988), 2.
Ibid; 5 
Ibid; 7 
“  Ibid; II
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The 1990s spurred a new growth of analysis into the recessionary period of the 1980s as a 
number of historians continued to examine Canada’s trade union leadership and the trend in 
Canada’s labour movement towards national independence from international unions. Bryan 
Palmer’s book. Working Class Experience: Rethinking the History o f Canadian Labour, 1800- 
1991, reflected frustration with the trade union movement. He argued that trade union leaders 
“stand fast, not for the interests of workers as a whole, as a class, but for their union’s rights over 
particular workers and their dues.”** Palmer further contended that the political maneuvering of 
the union leadership, through social unionism, had created a progressive façade “behind which a 
wing of the labour hierarchy adroitly masks its traditional business unionist refusal to use and 
extend the class power of the unions to launch a struggle for social change.”*® His contention that 
union leaders’ refuse to use the power of the working-class to promote change, adds to the 
growing number of historians who are challenging the labour movement to change their policies.
Craig Heron and Desmond Morton have similarly expressed concern with the trade union 
movement believing that competition between unions has fragmented the working class 
community. Craig Heron’s analysis. The Canadian Labour Movement: A Short History, showed 
the broadening of union jurisdiction to include white collar workers resulted in “fierce union 
rivalry” that deepened the divide between organizations in the Canadian labour movement, as 
they continued to remain suspicious of one another.'*® Desmond Morton similarly discussed 
union rivalry in his book. Working People: An Illustrated History o f the Canadian Labour 
Movement, in which he poignantly referred to the bitter union rivalry between the United Food 
and Commercial Workers Union (UFCW) and the Canadian Auto Workers Union (CAW) over
Bryan Palmer, Working Class Experience Rethinking the History o f  Canadian Labour. 1800-1991 (Toronto: 
McClelland & Stewart Inc., 1992), 371.
Ibid; 372.
Craig Heron, The Canadian Labour M ovement A  Short History 2"** Ed. (Toronto: James Lorimer & Company, 
1996), 140.
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the bargaining units of Nova Scotia’s, New Brunswick’s, and Newfoundland’s fishery workers in 
1986/' Morton perhaps best expressed the mood of the working-class and demonstrated the 
bleak future of trade unions; according to him, “union mergers are rarely a sign of strength. With 
mass unemployment, militancy faded. A strike could not reopen a factory or store, or prevent 
privatization; it merely cut off unemployment and severance benefits.”'** In his view, unions 
remained weak and isolated heading into the 1980s, as their most important bargaining tool, the 
strike, was limited because of unemployment. The recession made it possible for companies to 
pressure workers and their unions into accepting concessions.
Less critical of trade union leadership, Sam Gindin and Steven High have demonstrated 
how class antagonism directed against American internationalism and plant shutdowns led to the 
development of a unique Canadian “resistance culture.” Steven High’s Industrial Sunset: The 
Making o f North America’s Rust Belt, 1969-1984 depicted a resurgence of working-class 
militancy during the 1980s in response to the closure of mills and other factories within North 
America’s “industrial rust belt.” Unlike their American counterparts, who shared feelings of 
displacement, Canadian workers felt closer ties to the union and its leadership as they engaged in 
strike action against employers.'** Sam Gindin similarly argued in his article, “Globalization, 
Nationalism, and Internationalism,” that the Canadian Automobile Workers (CAW) asserted its 
independence from the American United Automobile Workers (UAW) during the 1980s based 
on the success and confidence it found in struggles with Ford, Chrysler, and General Motors 
Corporation. The break from the American UAW spurred the growth of Canadian nationalism.
Desmond Morton, Working People An Illustrated History o f  the Canadian Labour Movement 4“* Ed. (Toronto: 
McGill-Queens University Press, 1998), 331.
Ibid, 340.
Steven High, Industrial Sunset: The Making o f North America’s Rust Belt. 1969-1984 (Toronto: University of 
Toronto Press, 2003), 73.
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leading to a resurgence of working-class militancy directed at issues of health and safety, labour 
education, and a struggle against the Free Trade Agreement (FTA) with the United States/'* 
Further studies by Jean Morrison, examining the labour movements in Northwestern 
Ontario, have added to the historiography by depicting Thunder Bay as a militant working-class 
community. Her chapter in Thunder Bay: From Rivalry to Unity, edited by Thorold Tronrud and 
Ernest Epp, depicted the region’s ethnic militancy during the 1930s and the relative decline of 
the labour movement after World War II. Her analysis of industrial, private, and public sector 
unions in the region reflected the ethnic divisions in the community before the 1930s, the 
radicalization of Finns during the depression years, and the eventual decline and conservatism of 
the regions labour movement. Her study closely follows the beliefs of David Bercuson, Ian 
McCormack, and C.H. Pentland that working-class “radicalism and militancy were much 
stronger west of the Lakehead as a result of the unique frontier environment in which western 
workers found themselves.”'*® A number of historians have challenged the idea of “western 
exceptionalism” in the book The Workers’ Revolt in Canada 1917-1925, edited by Craig Heron, 
which attributes the unevenness of the workers’ revolt across Canada more to the “political 
economy, social structure and cultural practices and institutions than to region” and questions 
previous contentions that workers in Thunder Bay and in the west were more radical.'*®
While the debate surrounding working class militancy, regionalism, gender, ethnicity and 
labour leadership continues among labour historians, few have attempted to examine the 
Canadian retail sector or have limited their discussions to technological changes and 
management restructuring, where they have focused on workers experiences in the United States.
Sam Gindin, “Globalization, Nationalism, and Internationalism,” Canadian Working Class History: Selected  
Readings 2*“* Ed. ed. M acDowell & Radforth, (Toronto: Canadian Scholars Press, 2000), 706-25.
Craig Heron, The Worker’s Revolt in Canada 1917-1925 (Toronto: University o f  Toronto Press, 1998), 6. 
Ibid.
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Julie White’s article, “Unorganized Women,” is one exception, as she examined the level of 
unionization among women. Her analysis transcended a gender-based study to include the 
difficulties unions have faced in organizing the retail industry. Her study shows how unions 
have, since the post-1980s, held information sessions to organize and to expand into non- 
unionized areas.'** They have also engaged in a new style of social unionism, which engages the 
union to form coalitions with groups concerned with “the environment, peace, social services, 
rural issues, and the rights of racial minorities, persons with disabilities, and gays and 
lesbians.”'** White’s article, however, does not demonstrate the difficulties unions have faced in 
maintaining their foothold in the private sector.
Jan Kainer’s study, “Gender, Corporate Restructuring and Concession Bargaining in 
Ontario’s Food Retail Sector”, published in 1998, provides a clearer analysis of the private 
sector, particularly the supermarket industry. Kainer focuses on the gendered inequalities of the 
supermarket industry, where women are primarily employed as part-time workers in service jobs 
such as cashier or meat wrapper, compared to men who are hired on full-time production jobs, 
such as clerks or meat cutters. “Neither the United Food and Commercial Workers Union 
(UFCW) nor the Retail, Wholesale union (RW),” Kainer argues, successfully resisted “the labour 
flexibility initiatives of management, especially around part-time employment.”'*® In particular, 
she cites that unions such as the UFCW “are not opposing the implementation of new wage tiers 
which are dividing the workforce between the predominantly male full-time and predominantly 
female part-time categories.”®® As a consequence of a business style unionism, Kainer argues
Julie White, “Unorganized Women,” Canadian Working Class History Selected Readings 2" Ed ed. M acDowell 
& Radforth, (Toronto: Canadian Scholars Press, 2000) 726-763.
Ibid, 746.
Jan Kainer, “Gender, Corporate Restructuring and Concession Bargaining in Ontario’s Food Retail Sector”, 
Industrial Relations/Relations Industrielles, 53(1), (Winter, 1998), 184.
“  Ibid.
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that unions are in a “concessionary spiral” in which the retail food workers are becoming subject 
to declining wages and deteriorating work conditions.®' The notable exceptions were the Meat 
Cutters and Butchers, who because of their skill and separate bargaining arrangements, were able 
to exert considerable bargaining leverage, through which they have maintained higher wage rates 
and better collective agreements.®* Kainer’s study leads to serious debate about the effectiveness 
of unions in Canada against giant retailers such as Canada Safeway or the Atlantic & Pacific 
Company (A&P).
The Canada Safeway strike in Thunder Bay provides new insights into the trade union 
leadership during the post-1980s. This thesis attempts to answer a number of important 
questions. Why did Canada Safeway act so aggressively towards the UFCW and its 
membership? What caused dissention in the UFCW? Why did Canada Safeway policies help 
foster dissension among the UFCW membership? Did the UFCW adequately represent its 
membership during the Canada Safeway Strike? Why did a group of UFCW members seek a 
second vote on Canada Safeway’s “last, best and final offer”? Why did a group of UFCW 
members attempt to create an independent union, the “Safeway Workers’ Association”? Within 
this framework, this study of the Canada Safeway Strike examines working-class experiences in 
the private retail sector, an area that is largely understudied and needs to be further analyzed.
This study is a chronological analysis of the Canada Safeway strike. For the purpose of 
clarity, it has been divided into four chapters, each coinciding with a major event that altered the 
developments on the picket line. Chapter one discusses the history of Canada Safeway and the 
United Food and Commercial Workers Union, analyzing the Canada Safeway Strike in 1994 and 
its subsequent impact on the Thunder Bay Safeway employees leading into the Canada Safeway
Ibid, 185. 
“ ibid, 187.
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Strike which began in October 2001. Chapter two examines the early deception of the UFCW 
and the reaction of the rank-and-file members, which led some members to criticize the union 
leadership openly. Chapter three investigates the widening split among the rank-and-file 
members, leading into the government supervised vote on the “Final Offer.” Among other things, 
it discusses the company’s proposed contract, UFCW actions leading up to the vote, and the vote 
that shattered the UFCW’s notions of maintaining any working-class solidarity. Chapter four 
similarly discusses the fallout from the “Final Offer,” which led Canada Safeway to close the 
three Thunder Bay stores and some UFCW members to file charges against the UFCW with the 
Ontario Labour Relations Board. It also examines the reconciliation between the company and 
the union, which led to the ratification of a new contract. This analysis provides a deeper context 
for further study by Canadian labour historians, and others who are interested in the difficulties 
unions face in the private retail sector.
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Chapter One 
A. Canada Safeway before the Strike 
The United Food and Commercial Workers (UFCW), established in 1979 as an amalgam 
of the Retail Clerks International Union and the Amalgamated Meat Cutters and Butchermen, 
has become the nation’s leading private sector union in the supermarket industry, organizing 
workers at the Atlantic & Pacific Company Ltd., Canada Safeway Ltd, and Loblaws Inc. 
Subsequent mergers with The Brotherhood of Packinghouse and Industrial Workers Union in 
1989, and 80,000 American members of the Retail, Wholesale and Department Store Union and 
some 6,000 Canadian Retail, Wholesale and Department Store members in 1997, has bolstered 
the membership of the UFCW.' Before the creation of the UFCW in 1979, retail unions enjoyed 
a prosperous period in union-management relations. During the 1950s and 1960s, for example, 
“retail unions were able to secure accretion clauses in collective agreements that secured 
unionization of any new stores in a supermarket chain. The result was that retail unions 
negotiated master agreement that covered all of the stores in a geographic region.”* The relative 
success at unionizing workers in the supermarket?=led the UFCW to support business unionism as 
its labour philosophy. Business unionism focused on protecting and advancing workers’ 
economic interest at the expense of promoting broader economic or social reforms. Often 
successful at organizing, business unions, such as the UFCW, often “adopt a conservative 
approach to bargaining and are unlikely to become involved in militant forms of political 
action.”* By the late 1970s and 80s, corporations such as Canada Safeway began to adopt and 
disseminate more aggressive tactics during negotiations to erode the gains retail unions had made 
in the previous decades. Business unions responded by amalgamating to form larger
' Lisa Williamson, “Union Mergers: 1985-94”, Monthly Labor Review, 118(2) (1995), 7. 
 ̂Kairen, 188.
 ̂Ibid.
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organizations, covering a wider geographical region, such as the amalgam between the Retail 
Clerks International Union and the Amalgamated Meat Cutters and Butchermen, to form the 
UFCW in 1979. In Thunder Bay, Local 175 of the UFCW enjoyed some success at improving 
the economic interests of its members, as non-unionized workers were making roughly $7.00 per 
hour compared to an average wage of $17.24 for UFCW cashiers during the 1980s.'* Regardless 
of these increased wages, the UFCW began to suffer losses in the Thunder Bay region as Canada 
entered a recession in the 1980s. Its success at unionizing Kresge’s in Thunder Bay, for example, 
was defeated in 1985 after management hired employees who held anti-union sentiments in order 
to decertify the UFCW as the employees’ bargaining agent.®
The UFCW was likewise challenged by Safeway Ltd, which had been established in 1915 
by M B. Skaggs in the United States. The Skaggs chain of stores grew to include 428 stores in 10 
states by 1926 and expanded further when this company amalgamated with 322 Safeway stores. 
Two years later, Safeway was listed on the New York Stock Exchange.® The vast expansion of 
Safeway Limited in the United States prompted it to open stores throughout North America. By 
2001, Safeway Limited owned approximately 1,700 stores in the United States and Canada.* 
Contending with differences of labour practices, policies, and legislation, Safeway Limited 
opened a Canadian headquarters in Calgary to deal with the exigencies of the dissimilar labour 
market. Remaining tied to Safeway Limited’s philosophy and business practices, Canada
Jean Morrison, “The Organization o f Labour at Thunder Bay,” Thunder Bay From Rivalry to Unity, ed. Thorold J. 
Tronrud and A. Ernest Epp (Thunder Bay: The Thunder Bay Historical Museum Society Inc; 1995), 139.
’ Ibid.
® Due to the company’s refusal to assist me during my research for this, I had limited resources available regarding 
Canada Safeway’s history. What was available was found through websites. For further information see the Canada 
Safeway Ltd. Website at www.safeway.com .
’ Ibid.
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Safeway nevertheless followed suit with Safeway Limited and other corporations as they sought 
to erode the gains retail unions had made since the 1950s.*
The beginning of a recession in the 1980s and increased market segmentation has led 
companies to propose new cost effectiveness measures. As Jan Kainer has shown in her study 
“Gender, Corporate Restructuring and Concession Bargaining in Ontario’s Food Retail Sector,” 
“supermarkets face competition from large non-unionized mega discount stores, such as 
warehouse clubs and superstores, as well as from convenience stores, independent food retailers 
or franchise, fast-food outlets and drugstores.”® Responding to the increased competition from 
companies such as Walmart, supermarkets adopted a policy of maintaining profitability by 
reducing their full-time staff to part-time positions and implementing new wage tiers for part- 
time employees.'® An increase in competition in Thunder Bay after the construction of the Real 
Canadian Superstore in 1993, for example, led Canada Safeway to cut twenty-seven of its full­
time staff to part-time hours in preparation for expected loss of sales due to increased 
competition."
In Thunder Bay, Canada Safeway adopted a more aggressive policy towards the union 
during contract negotiations in 1994, when it attempted to reduce more of the company’s full­
time employees to part-time positions. The proposed contract offered buyout packages to 180 of 
its employees in an attempt to replace them with new part-time workers who would earn $3.20 
an hour less than the part-time employees who had been hired before the ratification of the new 
contract.'* It further called for a freeze in wages for two years, providing a fifteen cent per hour
® Safeway Limited was engaged in other strikes in the United States. During the strike against Canada Safeway in 
Thunder Bay, UFCW members in California were engaged in their own struggles against Safeway Limited.
 ̂Kainer, 186.
Ibid.
" Diana Alyward, ''Superchanges for Safeway Staff,” The Chronicle Jou rn a l April 15, 1993, A l.
“  Author Unkown, “Strike closes 5 Safeway stores: Clerks picket city's biggest grocer after narrowly rejecting
lastest offer,” The Chronicle-Journal, October 31, 1994, A8.
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wage increase in the third year for all employees.*^ On the recommendation of the UFCW local 
executive, fifty-three percent of the 550 Safeway employees rejected the o f f e r . A f t e r  a week of 
strike action by the employees, John Mather, a provincial mediator, recommended that Canada 
Safeway remove the proposed wage reductions. Agreeing to the recommendations, Canada 
Safeway forestalled its plan to implement a second tier wage scale for part-time employees. 
Employees accepted the negotiated contract, which included a two-year wage freeze and a fifteen 
percent wage increase in the third year by a sixty-six percent majority. The union’s success came 
at a cost, however, as Canada Safeway halted its construction of a new mega-store across from 
County Fair Plaza on Dawson Road.'^
The UFCW was only partially successful in forestalling Canada Safeway’s labour 
initiatives at reducing its full-time employees to part-time positions. A steady decline in the 
number of Canada Safeway employees was evident between 1994 and 2001. Canada Safeway 
employed 550 full and part-time workers during the 1994 strike, for example, but it employed 
only 430 workers in 2001, a loss of 120 employees over a seven year period. Job losses and 
shorter hours continued to afflict workers at Canada Safeway as the company restructured stores 
throughout the country. As early as 1995, Canada Safeway Ltd. closed its County Fair store, 
moving its twenty-eight full-time workers to part-time positions in other stores, while laying off 
forty-five part-time workers indefinitely.*^ A similar closure at Northwood Park, two weeks after
Doug Ferguson, “Movement in grocery strike: Canada Safeway and Union back into mediation on Friday,” The 
Chronicle-Journal, November 3, 1994, A t.
Author Unknown, “Strike closes 5 Safeway stores: Clerks picket city’s biggest grocer after narrowly rejecting 
lastest offer,” The Chronicle-Journal^ October 31, 1994, A8.
Doug Ferguson, “Safeway workers end strike: Company puts freeze on Dawson Road megastore,” The Chronicle- 
Journal, November 6, 1994, A l.
Author Unknown, “Safeway closing County Fair store,” The Chronicle-Journal, February 28, 1995, A l.
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the County Fair store closed, resulted in further job losses of seventeen full-time and forty-three 
part-time positions.*’
In 1995 Canada Safeway put forward a new contract proposal to the union. It stated the 
company would resume construction of the new mega-store at Dawson Road, and would rehire 
some of the employees laid off at the County Fair and Northwood Park stores, if the company 
received the union’s cooperation. The new store was expected to create 160 to 180 jobs.** The 
proposal also called for a second tier wage scale for all new part-time employees hired after the 
date of ratification. The union agreed that new part-time employees at the megastore would make 
a top rate of $10.38 an hour, compared to the $14.20 that part-time employees had made in 1995. 
According to the union, the new contract, which included the introduction of a two-tier wage 
scale for part-time employees, was acceptable since it provided job security for its membership.
The negotiations in 1995 set a precedent for future negotiations between Canada Safeway 
and the UFCW. The union’s failure to reject the company’s introduction of a two tier wage scale 
for part-time employees after Safeway Canada closed two of the five Thunder Bay stores 
demonstrated the relative weakness of the union in negotiating with the company. The UFCW 
entered a “concessionary spiral” which continued to affect the majority of part-time employees 
during the contract negotiations in 2001. Canada Safeway was able to strengthen its position by 
asking for further concessions from the union and its members through the rest of the decade, 
which led to further action by the company against its employees through job layoffs, reduced 
hours, and cutbacks in employee benefits. In 1996, for example, the company terminated five 
positions in Thunder Bay, primarily in administrative and secretarial work, and reduced some
Author Unknown, “Safeway closing at Northwood,” The Chronicle-Journal, March 23 ,1995 , A l.
18 John Ayearst, “Green light for Safeway megastore,” The Chronicle-Journal, May 1, 1995, A l.
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full-time positions to part-time “as a result of a corporate restmcturing program.” *̂  A pattern of 
success for Canada Safeway, whereby it was able to replace much of its full-time staff with part- 
time employees in an effort to reduce costs was thus well established and led into the Canada 
Safeway strike in 2001, encouraging the company to continue pursuing this tactic.
B; Strike Vote
Tensions among management, union officials, and Canada Safeway employees reached a 
boiling point during the 2001 contract negotiations. Employee grievances against the company 
were a central issue leading into the strike. Employees often complained about the reduction in 
part-time hours, increased work loads, lack of seniority rights, and arbitrary schedule changes. 
Among the more important issues for part-time employees was the cutback in the number of 
part-time hours. Some part-time workers complained about management’s lack of flexibility 
regarding shift changes and availability.’ * While the part-time workers felt the financial burden, 
full-time senior staff were pushed to their limits as they were forced to do increased amounts of 
work due to the limited labour fund.”
Others experienced even more pressure, as employees such as Cindy MacLeod, a meat 
cutter for fifteen years, “heard that the company was bringing pre-packaged meat to Thunder 
Bay. It meant if customers wanted a special cut of meat, they had to order it from Winnipeg and 
most of the local meat cutters... would be let go.””  Customer complaints against the proposed 
introduction of pre-packaged meat went unheard by the company but not those employees who
Author Unknown, “Job losses, fewer hours part o f Safeway changes,” The Chronicle-Journal, April 3, 1996, A l.  
^  Bill Trbovich, W e are here to STAY (Thunder Bay: The United Food and Commercial Workers Union Local 175, 
2004), 2.
Interview 3A, January 16, 2006 and Interview 2A, Fall 2005.
^  Interview lA , Summer 2005.
“  Trbovich; 2.
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worked in the meat department. Cindy MacLeod recalled how customers “couldn’t believe that 
Safeway was actually doing that. I told them they could still get their meat cuts but it’s going to 
take a week. They had to place an order in advance and they would get right pissed at me! I 
would give them a card and say write to the company and tell them. Boy, they were mad and 
many of them said they would go elsewhere.””  Despite customer complaints and employee 
resistance to the proposed changes, Canada Safeway pressed ahead with its plans.
Early negotiations with the company, beginning in June 2001, proved a disappointment 
for the UECW, as Canada Safeway refused to guarantee more hours and higher wages for its 
part-time employees, refused to increase the number of hours for senior part-time workers, and 
insisted on introducing pre-packaged meats in Winnipeg and possibly Thunder Bay.”  Sharon 
Gall, director of the UFCW Local 175 Northern Region, described the process as slow and 
tedious for the bargaining committee; “the only gain for part-timers was 30 cents per hour, but 
what good is that when you can’t get your normal quota of hours...? No benefits were offered for 
part-timers and [the company] wanted to roll back vacation entitlement for existing and new full­
time employees.””  The biggest issue, according to the union, was the proposal introducing 
counter-ready meats. The fact that the UFCW was an amalgamation of the Retail Clerks 
International Union and the Meat Cutter and Butcher Workmen of North America, made the 
possible elimination of the meat departments all the more painful, as it attacked the foundation of 
the union, mainly the meat cutters. While the company did not plan to implement counter-ready 
meats until it had completed contract negotiations with the Manitoba stores in November, the
Ibid; 7.
^  Kris Ketonen, “Safeway strike near,” The Chronicle-Journal, September 19, 2001, A3. See also, Wayne Hanley, 
and Andress, Jim, “Labour Dispute” UFCW Local 175, handout.
^  Trbovich, 9.
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UFCW maintained its duty to protect the thirty full and part-time workers in the meat department
who would be displaced by the new contract.”
Members of the UFCW negotiating committee began to question Canada Safeway’s
agenda during the contract negotiations. Shawn Harris, a negotiator for the UFCW, cited
frustration with the company and the belief that the company wanted a strike.’* Executive
Assistant John Fuller of UFCW Local 175 also thought that the company
wasn’t interested in finding a settlement. The company put out a position, albeit not on 
paper but across the table, that they were prepared to agree to a full-time job complement if 
we were prepared to recommend the deal. That wasn’t a problem but some of the other 
four or five issues on the table were a problem. So when I went up two weeks later, we 
knocked all of those issues down and I said to the company, if  you put the full time job 
complement proposal back on the table this should form a recommended deal from the 
union negotiating committee. Safeway’s negotiators said they weren’t prepared to put it 
back on the table.
Tim Ryan, another negotiator for the UFCW, felt that the company was playing the full and part- 
time employees off against each other; he recalls how some of the “issues withdrawn from the 
table included the ratio of full-time jobs and wording for part-time hours. Once we tried for the 
wording of the part-time hours and then the full-time was gone. They played the full-timers 
against the part-timers. It was divide and conquer.”*** Local 175’s President, Wayne Hanley, 
attributed the confusion of the negotiations to Canada Safeway’s parent company, Safeway 
Limited, in the United States.** “Up until the strike commenced people from other local unions 
across the country had said that the decisions wouldn’t be at the bargaining table in Thunder 
Bay; they’d be made down in California. Once the strike started all the shots were openly called




The UFCW filed an unfair labour practices application with the Ontario Labour Relations Board on September 20, 
“alleging Safeway violated a section of the Labour Relations A ct.... The application was filed because Safeway 
changed its demands during the course o f  negotiations.... Safeway dismissed the allegations.” Ward Holland, 
“Safeway set to dump stores; union,” The Chronicle-Journal October 25, 2001, A3.
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from south of the border.”*’ Union negotiators became frustrated with the negotiation process as 
Canada Safeway negotiators often had to reconsider, and at times withdraw previous agreements, 
to suit the needs of Safeway negotiators in the United States.
The company’s refusal to deal with issues such as job security for full-time meat cutters 
and wrappers, a guarantee of hours for part-time employees, and management’s honoring 
seniority rights,** led the workers to reject Canada Safeway’s contract offer by a 96 per cent 
majority in early September 2001. Subsequent attempts by the company to avert a strike through 
new contract negotiations led the union to postpone the strike deadline. New contract proposals 
put forward by the company on September 13, 2001 were not taken to the members for a second 
vote because the UFCW believed that the company had not altered the contract enough to justify 
bringing it to the membership.*'* A third and final contract proposal, presented to the membership 
on September 28, 2001, delayed the strike, but only for a short time.**
Flaving reached an impasse during the contract negotiations, the UFCW felt that a strike 
was unavoidable and this led the negotiating committee to reject the offer by Canada Safeway. 
While the third contract proposal included such benefits as a thirty cent per hour wage increase 
for part-time employees hired before May 1, 1995, including retroactive pay for all “regular 
hours worked or paid (including Sunday) from September 9, 2001 until the Saturday following 
ratification,” a five cent an hour night shift premium, and an agreement with the company to 
follow past practice in respecting seniority rights among part-time workers,*^ it nevertheless 
sought to implement a number of detrimental proposals. Canada Safeway, for example, would
Trbovich, 15.
Kris Ketonen, “Safeway Strike a go,” The Chronicle-Journal, October 1, 2001, A l.
Ketonen, “Safeway strike near”, A3
Kris Ketonen, “Strike closes Thunder Bay Safeway stores,” The Chronicle Journal, October 2, 2001, A l.  
September 28, 2001 “Full and Complete Company Offer In the Matter o f Collective Agreement between Canada 
Safeway Limited, Thunder Bay, Ontario, and United Food and Commercial Workers, Local 175,” 2
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maintain the right to continue operating under its current scheduling practice, allowing the 
company to change the “length of shifts for night shift employees subject to business conditions 
or the requirement to efficiently operate the business necessitating a change.”*’ Another 
amendment targeted employees’ availability. It would allow the company to schedule new 
employees hired after ratification to work Sundays “irrespective of their Declarations of 
Availability.”** Besides the lack of flexibility in part-time hours, another major stumbling block 
in the proposed contract was Canada Safeway’s attempt to secure a new letter of understanding 
to the effect:
That in the event the Company implements Counter Ready Meat into this market, the 
solution agreed upon in Manitoba negotiations in respect to Counter Ready Meat will be 
implemented into the Thunder Bay Retail Collective Agreement in respect to Thunder Bay 
meat Department employees affected by the introduction of Counter Ready Meat in 
Thunder Bay.*^
While the collective agreement would provide full and part-time meat workers an opportunity to 
transfer from one department to another, it still would mean a loss of thirty positions at Canada 
Safeway in Thunder Bay.
On September 28, 2001, four hundred workers employed at Canada Safeway and 
represented by the United Food and Commercial Workers Union (UFCW) converged at the 
Lakehead Labour Centre to cast their ballots on this latest contract proposal by the company. 
Faced with an impending strike, workers were forced to make a decision either to accept the 
contract, which offered a thirty cent wage increase for part-time workers at the expense of losing 
thirty full and part-time positions in the meat department, or to reject the offer and to face the 
company on the picket line in the hopes that the company would withdraw its more controversial 
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part-time hours, and more respect from management. It was clear as soon as members walked 
into the Labour Centre that the UFCW wanted the membership to vote against the contract and 
go on strike against Canada Safeway. The hall was filled with anti-Safeway signs, advising 
“cutting down the club card,” and a “Safeway sign with an X through it.”"*** The lead speaker, 
Sharon Gall, the Regional Director of Local 175 Northern Region, was led by a procession of 
strike supporters playing “Kiss her goodbye,” by the Nylons, in order to inflame the members 
against Canada Safeway; her message was simple “W e’re going to get what we deserve!”'** 
Surrounded by anti-Safeway propaganda, eighty-one percent of the membership voted to go on 
strike against Canada Safeway beginning October 1, 2001."*’ They would remain on strike until 
Febmary 17, 2003.
Interview 4 A, 2006.
Ibid.
Kris Ketonen, “Strike closes Thunder Bay Safeway stores,” The Chronicle-Journal, October 2, 2001, A l.
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Chapter 2 
A: Life on the Picket Line 
Canada Safeway Ltd., and the United Food and Commercial Workers Union (UFCW) 
both thought the strike would be short lived. Previous work stoppages in the region often lasted 
only a few days or had been averted at the last minute.* Most members were exuberant about the 
strike, believing that they would soon be supported by members in Manitoba who were poised to 
strike against Canada Safeway in November.’ Support from other Safeway stores was crucial to 
the negotiation process in Thunder Bay. It was believed that the support of the 3, 300 Manitoba 
workers would force Canada Safeway to negotiate in a fair and positive manner, and lead to a 
contract that would benefit the UFCW and its members.
During the strike vote at the Lakehead Labour Centre, union leaders had encouraged 
members to strike, promising that stores in Fort Frances, Dryden, and Kenora as well as 
Winnipeg “would support our strike vote by going on strike themselves.”* Members also 
received handouts and updates from picket captains indicating the Manitoba workers would be 
on strike right behind the Thunder Bay workers."* The union published messages of solidarity 
from Manitoba workers and distributed them to members to encourage morale. Heather Reaves, 
a meat wrapper in Manitoba, wrote a letter to members in Thunder Bay letting them know that 
they were not alone in their fight with Safeway; “We are all in this together.... Hopefully we will 
stick to our guns, wanting fairness, job security and benefits, and be as strong as you are being!
' Canada Safeway “employees were on strike for seven days in 1994. The Thunder Bay workers also voted 96 per 
cent in favour o f a strike in 1997, and Kenora Safeway em ployees voted 95 per cent in favour in 1996. Strike action 
was averted in both cases.” Kris Ketonen, “Safeway prepares for strike Stock cutbacks under way in Thunder Bay 
stores,” The Chronicle-Journal. September 21, 2001, A l.
 ̂Kris Ketonen, “Strike closes Thunder Bay Safeway stores,” The Chronicle-Journal, October 2, 2001, A l 
 ̂ Interview 4A, 2006.
'* Interview I A, 2005.
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You are sending the message that we hope to send!”* Others such as Diana White, a baker in 
Manitoba, stated that members in Thunder Bay were “not alone in this battle of fairness; we are 
in the middle of negotiations and they are not going well. We too may be out in Nov. We have to 
be strong and unified in our battle. We are behind you 100%”® Statements made by the UFCW 
and its members in Manitoba were designed to raise morale on the picket line and make 
members believe they could win the strike against Canada Safeway if they remained united.
Local media coverage of the situation in Manitoba also encouraged UFCW members to 
think that a strike in Manitoba was pending. An article in the local newspaper. The Chronicle- 
Journal, published in late October, stated that over “3,300 Safeway employees in Manitoba have 
voted 93 per cent in favour of a strike on Nov. 12.” The most pressing issue on the table, 
according to the newspaper, was Canada Safeway’s plan to implement counter-ready meat.’ 
Issues such as a five dollar per hour wage reduction, put forward in the contract proposal, 
likewise hindered the negotiation process. Canada Safeway further threatened to liquidate “its 35 
stores in Manitoba, leaving 3,300 employees without jobs,” if they did not accept the contract.* 
Articles presented in the media led a number of workers in Manitoba and Thunder Bay to believe 
that a strike was inevitable.
A decision by UFCW Local 832 Manitoba and Canada Safeway to go to binding 
arbitration in order to avert a strike dashed the hopes of many UFCW members in Thunder Bay.^ 
Choosing arbitration over strike action was a difficult decision for the UFCW Local 832
 ̂UFCW, Local 175, handout. “Solidarity! A M essage from your Manitoba Brothers and Sisters.”
® Ibid.
 ̂Julio Gomes, “Safeway strike front could heat up,” The Chronicle-Journal October 2 3 ,2 0 0 1 , A3. Another article 
published in a different local newspaper, the Thunder Bay Post, observed that “Safeway workers in Manitoba may 
also be hitting the streets with 93 per cent o f the membership there voting in favour o f a strike. They will be in a 
legal strike position sometime next month.” Author Unknown, “Safeway workers left out in the cold,” Thunder Bay 
Post, October 19, 2001, A5.
* Ward Holland, “Safeway set to dump stores: union,” The Chronicle-Journal, October 25, 2001, A l.
® Kris Ketonen, “N o Movement on Safeway scene; Arbitration set in Manitoba,” The Chronicle-Journal. November 
6, 2001, A4.
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Manitoba members, but as Bob Linton, a UFCW spokesman suggested, it was the more logical 
choice. In his view, “they probably decided to go to arbitration because, if you look at the 
company and the profits of the company, it’s pretty hard for them to argue they need a wage 
concession of $5 an hour.”*® Canada Safeway likewise benefited from binding arbitration, since 
its major concern was the introduction of counter-ready meats, which other supermarkets, mega­
stores, and warehouse clubs had introduced in previous years, leading the company to believe 
counter-ready meats would be accepted by an arbitrator.
The decision of the UFCW to pursue binding arbitration in Manitoba benefited Local 832 
members, but hindered the negotiation efforts in Thunder Bay. Without the support of the 
Manitoba members, and with negotiations in Fort Frances, Dryden and Kenora months away, the 
members of Local 175 wavered in their support of the UFCW and its leadership. Some members 
in Thunder Bay were not only disappointed the Manitoba workers were not going to strike, but 
were surprised and angry with the union for not informing them that workers in Manitoba had 
the option of averting a strike through arbitration. One member criticized the union, arguing that 
the union leadership “didn’t tell the membership that in Manitoba that they have the right to 
arbitration, so they went to arbitration instead of going on strike. Winnipeg was not behind us ... 
there was nobody behind us but us.”** Another member also reflected disappointment with the 
union but felt the UFCW had not misled members intentionally.*’ Faced with fighting the 
company alone, many of the members grew tired of being on the picket line. Canada Safeway’s 
refusal to give Thunder Bay workers the same treatment “Safeway’s Manitoba workers would 
get from an arbitrator,” only added to the growing “number of members wanting to return to
Ketonen, “No Movement on Safeway scene Arbitration set in Manitoba”, A4. 
Interview 4A, 2006.
Interview 3A, 2005.
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work.”** While UFCW members still generally supported the UFCW leadership, they felt 
frustrated with the ongoing strike. For many members in Thunder Bay, the decision of UFCW 
Local 832 Manitoba to avert a strike through arbitration only added to their frustration at being 
on strike and led many to fear the strike would last a long time.
Canada Safeway’s refusal to accept arbitration to settle the strike in Thunder Bay was just 
one aggressive move it made against the union, damaging morale on the picket line. Prior to the 
strike, Canada Safeway had threatened to lay off forty workers, represented by UFCW Local 
175, at MacDonald’s Consolidated Wholesale Grocers. Four weeks into the Canada Safeway 
strike, UFCW members at the warehouse received notice that half of the employees would be 
laid off in early November if the strike continued at the Canada Safeway stores.*"* Canada 
Safeway likewise continued to maintain the offer presented to the membership on September 28, 
2001, and rejected by an 81 per cent majority, was the best it could do.** Unable to reach an 
agreement, Canada Safeway adopted a more aggressive policy in an effort to end the strike on its 
terms. On October 23, 2001, the company reported the original contract had been pulled off the 
table as it examined “the economic consequences of the 23-day-old strike and weigh[ed] last 
week’s news that wholesaler Costco could enter the Thunder Bay market by next summer.” *® . 
The new proposal demanded, among other things, a longer contract, employee layoffs, and the 
reduction of some full-time staff to part-time positions.*’ Further threats by the company to close
Trbovich; 21.
The warehouse supplied one hundred independent grocers with Safeway products, but fifty percent o f their 
supplies went to the three Safeway stores in Thunder Bay. Ward Holland, “Layoffs byproduct o f strike: Safeway’s 
distribution warehouse faces worker cuts,” The Chronicle-Joumal, October 26, 2001, A l.
Kris Ketonen, “Strike closes Thunder Bay Safeway stores,” The Chronicle-Journal, October 2, 2001, A l.
Julio Gomes, “Safeway strike front could heat up,” The Chronicle-Journal, October 23, 2001, A3.
Kris Ketonen, “Safeway union looks for support from U.S. members,” The Chronicle-Journal, November 28, 
2001, A3.
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the three stores, if the strike lasted too long, demonstrated its commitment to continuing the 
strike until the union agreed to grant further concessions to make up for the loss in profits.'*
With Christmas fast approaching and no end in sight, some UFCW members responded 
to the company and union in their own way, causing a serious rift on the picket line. In an 
unsigned letter to the membership, which was later published in The Chronicle-Joumal, some 
members accused the union of prolonging the strike in an effort to “save face by not initiating 
talks.” '^ Written on November 22, 2001, For Your Information was intended to strike a chord 
with workers in an effort to get them to question the union’s decisions and encourage them to 
make their own decisions.”  The author, Jim Berlinquette, a meat manager at Canada Safeway 
who was slated to lose his job, criticized the union for having said that “the Safeway stores in 
Winnipeg were going to be right behind us when the time came” when such a promise could not 
be realized.’* He further argued that the UFCW was keeping the membership on the picket line 
over nothing more than a guarantee of hours for part-time workers, contending that “in this day 
of slow economic times no company can guarantee hours.””  Berlinquette also questioned why
Kris Ketonen, “Retail Realities: Safeway may close stores, spokeswoman says,” The Chronicle-Journal, 
N ovem ber?, 2001, A14.
F or Your Information, November 22, 2001.
Ibid.
Ibid. Jim Berlinquette was one o f only a few department managers who were in a separate bargaining unit than the 
rest o f  Canada Safeway employees, represented by the UFCW. His job still remained on the chopping block, with 
the rest o f the meat department cutters and wrappers. The issues in the Canada Safeway strike did not benefit his 
bargaining unit, but remained detrimental, which is possibly one reason he remained critical o f the union and som e 
its demands o f the company. That being said, he was supported by a number o f other full-time workers who were on 
strike and had a vested interest in the bargaining process. See also. Interview 4A, 2006.
^  Ibid. An official UFCW  Local 175 newsletter, published in mid-September, stated that “the Company has also 
failed to address issues such as management working on the floor, a guarantee of 24 hours for part-time em ployees 
or a transfer o f part-time em ployees between departments so they can get their 24 hours.” Based on the information 
published by the UFCW it is apparent that Jim Berlinquette’s concerns were legitimate. See, Union N ew s UFCW  
Local 175, “An official publication o f  UFCW Local 175 to update Members employed at Canada Safeway on the 
status o f  negotiations o f  their new collective agreement.”
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the UFCW pushed the membership to strike when other unions in the past often continued to 
work without a contract during the negotiation process.’*
The letter For Your Information struck a chord on the picket line, creating the beginnings 
of a divide among the membership. Those who supported Jim Berlinquette and the ideas he 
presented in the letter, sought a resolution to end the strike by pressuring the union and company 
to resume talks; while aware of Canada Safeway’s aggressive policies, they nevertheless 
criticized the union leadership for the way it handled the negotiations and for having lied to the 
membership. A second group, which enjoyed considerable support from the membership and 
community at the beginning of the strike, supported the union leadership and sought to end the 
strike by maintaining solidarity on the picket line and forcing Canada Safeway to negotiate fairly 
with the union leadership.
The material presented in For Your Information found support from a number of union 
members who had already expressed dissent with the UFCW and the majority’s decision to vote 
against the first contract. One worker described the strike vote as a “freak show,” arguing the 
union leadership had not acted in a professional manner. The use of anti-Safeway propaganda, 
including the procession of union supporters singing “Kiss her goodbye,” only inflamed the 
crowd against Canada Safeway instead of providing the membership with the chance to make an 
informed decision.’"* Another supporter believed that even if Canada Safeway had presented 
“something made o f... gold, “the best offer!” everybody gets a raise! I still think everyone in that 
room would have rejected it, just because that was the thing to do when any offer is presented to 
you.”’* Those members who disagreed with the strike believed that members were not properly
Ibid.
Interview 4A, 2006. 
Interview I A, 2005.
R eproduced  with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission.
34
informed by the union leadership, leading them to vote in favour of strike action out of 
ignorance.
Others expressed concern about the way the UFCW had handled the strike vote but 
attributed the union’s anti-Safeway stance to Sharon Gall, director of the UFCW Local 175 
Northern Region. They believed that Gall’s presence was a disruptive influence during the 
negotiations since she was from Eastern Ontario and was unfamiliar with the economic 
difficulties Northwestern Ontario had suffered since the 1980s. They argued, for example, that it 
was the first time the union had “ever had somebody come from down east to negotiate with 
Safeways in Thunder Bay. W e’ve had people come from down east, but they worked... in 
Northwestern Ontario.””  They also believed that Gall and Colby Flank, another UFCW 
representative leading the negotiations for the UFCW, did not get along with Jim Witiuk, the 
President of Labour Relations at Canada Safeway.”  They contended that Gall was determined to 
push a strike on Canada Safeway in an effort to further her career in the UFCW. One member 
pointed to Gall’s unprofessional behavior regarding contract negotiations, alleging she had said, 
“We have Safeway by the balls!”’* Still others expressed concern since the union was using the 
membership in Thunder Bay to take a stand against Canada Safeway, setting a precedent for the 
rest of negotiations across the country.’^
The UFCW picket line policies and procedures received further criticism by some o f the 




^  Ibid. During a group interview, all agreed that Canada Safeway had used the Thunder Bay stores as a warning to 
the rest o f the UFCW Locals across the country not to go on strike. Negotiations in Thunder Bay dragged out long 
enough for Canada Safeway to settle a contract in Manitoba, Fort Frances, Dryden and Kenora, as well as in British 
Columbia.
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dependent, after being on strike for fifty-six days,*® they were nevertheless strictly regulated on
the picket line. As solidarity had wavered leading into Christmas, the union sought to impose
further restrictions in the New Year, by forcing picketers to be “responsible for one shift between
12:00 noon to 4:00 pm” because of the shortfall the union was experiencing on the picket lines
during that time.** Picketers were likewise forced to wear UFCW bibs “in a visible manner” or
be refused strike pay.*’
Criticisms made of the union leadership, which began to be vocally expressed on the
picket line, soon spilled out into the community. For example, a letter to the editor published in
The Chronicle-Joumal in February 2002 criticized UFCW picket line policies. Written by the
son of a twenty-three-year veteran of Canada Safeway who asked to remain anonymous “for the
protection and privacy” of his mother, it contended that the UFCW was asking too much from its
members by forcing them to work sixteen hours a week “for just barely over $100.” Union
members were expected to picket
One weekend day, one day from 8 am to 12 pm, one day from 12 pm to 4 pm, and one 
evening! How crazy is this? They make very little money, they are striking in winter 
(thankfully it has mostly not been too cold!), and they do not get to choose their hours! Is it 
fair to deduct money when someone has put in their 16 hours, but didn’t do one of the 
demanded shifts? Is this even legal?**
He further discussed the emotional heart ache his mother and her friends felt as a result of the
strike. He believed that the “increase in depression is becoming startling and the rise in arguing
and bullying on the line among those who used to be friends is frightening!” He called on the
Thunder Bay community to contact the UFCW local “and demand fair treatment of Safeway
employees,” stating “maybe with the help of our city we can get these deserving folks back to
Kris Ketonen, “No Movement on Safeway scene: Arbitration set in Manitoba,” The Chronicle Journal, Novem ber 
6, 2001, A4.
Sharon Gall, Regional Director, Memo to All Safeway Picketers, January 17, 2002.
Interview 4A, 2006.
Letter to the Editor, “Strikers facing unfair demands,” The Chronicle-Joumal, February 8, 2002.
R eproduced  with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission.
36
work, and perhaps a few friendships and lives will not have been too damaged.””  The boy’s 
comments were particularly important in demonstrating first hand the emotional turmoil the 
strike produced in his family. Unlike some members in the community who viewed Canada 
Safeway as the aggressor, the young man targeted the UFCW in blaming it for the problems his 
family, particularly his mother, were suffering.
Supporters of the ideas presented in the material For Your Information also believed that, 
while the strike was fought partly to protect the 35 full and part-time meat department workers 
who were slated to lose their jobs, the main reason was to ensure a guarantee of part-time hours. 
One supporter thought “meat was one of the issues, but also... the decreasing of hours. Clerks, 
for example,., were not getting their twenty-four hours. That was why I think everyone voted” to 
go on strike.**
One reason union critics believed part-time workers were prolonging the strike was 
because junior part-time workers earned more money on the picket line than while working for 
Canada Safeway. During the strike vote in October 2001, one member overheard Gall telling 
part-time workers they would make more on the picket line.*® Union critics’ concerns appeared 
legitimate, as a closer examination revealed that part-time workers hired on or after May 1, 1995, 
particularly those who had suffered a reduction in the number of hours before the strike, did earn 
more on the picket line than they did while working for Canada Safeway. Prior to the strike, for 
example, part-time workers hired on or after May 1, 1995 earned a minimum wage of $6.85 and 
a top wage of $12.80. On average, part-time workers in the lower wage bracket would have had 
to work a minimum of eighteen hours to receive the same pay as they received while on strike. 
Similarly, workers earning $7.85 would have to work sixteen hours, workers earning $8.65
Ibid.
Interview I A, 2005. 
^  Interview 4A, 2006.
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would have to work fourteen hours, workers earning $9.65 would have to work thirteen hours, 
and those in the top wage would have to work at least nine hours to receive the same wage as 
they did on the picket line. Part-time workers were also eligible to receive financial assistance 
from the UFCW to cover medical expenses, the cost of utilities or to help pay a mortgage, which 
they otherwise would have had difficulty meeting had they been employed at Canada Safeway.
A letter to the editor by a full-time Safeway worker, published in the Thunder Bay Post 
on February 15, 2002, criticized the UFCW and attacked the part-time workers who were on 
strike. The author argued that it was ridiculous for the UFCW to expect previous full-time 
workers to picket “according to their rules,” when they were now forced to work at minimum 
wage to pay bills; “you are not paying my bills UFCW. I am working part-time and picketing 
hours around this job, so don’t dictate to me.”*’ Attacking the part-time workers, the author 
argued that part-timers should work the hours the UFCW needed covered since it was paying for 
their mortgages and loans, even though they were the ones who wanted to strike. The letter 
concluded; “If the part-timers are so unhappy for so many years why have they not looked 
elsewhere? And ‘bull’ that you say the morale is high! You know for a fact it is not!”** The 
union critics questioned a number of UFCW policies and procedures, leading some UFCW 
supporters to defend the strike and union leadership.
Ian Miller, a retired UFCW Local 175 Union Representative, living in Deseronto, 
Ontario, helped manage the strike funds. “He said the guidelines for additional financial 
assistance were quite straightforward. Members who fulfilled their strike duties and faced 
financial hardship, could apply for assistance.... The policy of the local union is to make the
37
Ibid.
Letters to the Editor, “Safeway strike response,” Thunder Bay Post, February 15, 2002, p. A7.
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decisions entirely based on merit, on what’s on the paper in front of me at the time.”*̂  
Nevertheless, cases of discrimination against those members who were outspoken against the 
union did take place. One member recalled how everyone looked at the union critics differently 
because they supported some of the ideas presented in the material For Your Information', critics 
were often followed on the picket line as a means of intimidation. Members who supported the 
union assumed the critics were acting as spies for the company. They were often bombarded by 
propaganda from the picket captains or other members in an attempt to bring them back into the 
fold of union supporters."*® Another member who disagreed with the strike recalled how he/she 
had fulfilled his or her picket duties but was deducted pay for taking too long a break, while 
other acquaintances who supported the union and logged the same break time received their full 
strike pay."** Most members were unaware that they had the option of performing volunteer work 
in the community, as long as it was approved by the UFCW, in lieu of picket duty to receive 
financial assistance, because the union did not bother to inform its members of their choices.
While opposition to the UFCW policies and procedures appeared on the picket line and in 
the community, the union still enjoyed support from the membership. Bob Linton, a UFCW 
spokesman, was one of the first to deny the accusations published by the material For Your 
Information, saying “that at no time did the union assure its Thunder Bay members that 
Winnipeg would back them up. They operate quite separately from us.” He further added that 
part-time workers at the Atlantic and Pacific Company Ltd. (A&P) received guaranteed hours, 




“With less than one year seniority, A&P workers are guaranteed five hours per week. With more than one year, 
they get at least 15 hours per week. With five years, it’s 18 hours; more than seven years, 22 hours; and eight years, 
24 hours.” Kris Ketonen, “Union not tyring to end strike: Safeway worker,” The Chronicle-Journal, November 26, 
2001, A I and A3. A  follow  up article questioned this assumption, arguing that the “A&P collective bargaining
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members who disagreed with the union leadership, Linton criticized the writer for not signing the 
document; “If the membership felt that way, why aren’t they signing it? And the reality is, this is 
a democracy and democracy rules. And although not everyone may agree with it, that’s the way 
we operate.. . .The majority rules.”"** In an attempt to curtail further dissension on the picket line. 
President Wayne Hanley of the UFCW Local 175 attempted “to set the record straight.”"*"* He 
reaffirmed that A&P had guaranteed hours for part-time workers, and that “there was no 
stumbling block respecting guaranteed hours for part-time as that issue was on the table and 
agreed upon.” Moreover, Hanley clearly stated that there were no ties between workers in 
Manitoba and Thunder Bay but did not reiterate that no promises had been made to the 
membership that Manitoba workers would be on strike right behind the Thunder Bay workers."** 
Reacting similarly to Bob Linton, Hanley criticized the writer, by arguing the letter constituted 
“fear mongering and [was] totally unproductive and destructive. These people should stop now!” 
He further reassured the membership that their Local was listening to them, was willing to talk to 
them, and fully supported them.
The supporters of the union were often reverent in their loyalty. A letter from Karen Wyder 
sent to the editor at the Chronicle Journal, for example, expressed gratitude to the UFCW for 
everything the union leadership had done in supporting the members on the picket line. She 
particularly expressed appreciation to the union for establishing a food cupboard, for providing 
financial assistance, and for setting up a motor home for members to warm themselves in while 
on the picket line. She further chastised the “few bad apples in the bunch, who recently put out a
agreement... uses the phrase ‘where practicable’ regarding guaranteed hours.... Linton was quick to assure the 
phrasing isn’t an ‘out’ for the company, and part-time workers do get the hours they’re guaranteed in the contract.” 
Kris Ketonen, “Safeway union looks for support from U.S. members,” The Chronicle-Journal, November 28, 2001, 
A3.
Ketonen, “Union not trying to end strike: Safeway worker,” A l and A3.
Wayne Hanley, “A M essage from President Wayne Hanley,” United Food & Commercial Workers International 
Union Locals 175 and 633, November 26, 2001.
Ibid.
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letter... blaming the union for the length of this strike,” contending that they forgot the company
was the one who put their employees out on the picket line in the first place.”  She also
admonished them for their behaviour, contending that
I am proud of our union and my brothers and sisters I walk with. It is a shame that all our 
members do not feel this way. Do these few people feel that whining and complaining is of 
any benefit to anyone? Also, printing hurtful comments is a very childish thing to do. To 
not even have the courage to own up to it. Do you feel so much better now? We know who 
you are? Eventually, we will return to work again. Have you thought about that?"*’
Remaining critical of the company, Wyder commented that she felt embarrassed to say she
worked for Canada Safeway."**
Another union supporter, Pauline Quinn, responded with her own letter to the writer and
his supporters, which she paid to have published in a full page advertisement in the Chronicle-
Joumal on December 8, 2001. According to Quinn, over half of her co-workers who voted to
strike did not endorse the “For Your Information viewpoint.”"*̂ She defended the union and its
leaders’ ability to preserve morale on the picket line by maintaining a respectful and
approachable manner and by offering strike seminars to the membership. Criticizing the writer
and his supporters, Quinn challenged “their statements, method of delivery, and lack of ethics in
the content of the leaflet,” suggesting that “they are the chosen few who stand to benefit from the
ethical approach Canada Safeway has opted to employ.”*® Others defended UFCW policies and
procedures on the picket line. Heidi Pineau and Barb Carr, for example, stated in a letter to the
editor that they had been “treated more than fairly” by the union. They cited occasions such as
the “Christmas gift certificates, meals, parties,” and the food bank, demonstrating the union’s
fairness. They further contended that “people who are on assistance get help so none lose houses
^  Karen Wyder, Interview 5 A, 2006. 
47 Ibid.
4® Ibid.
4® Pauline Quinn, “An Open Letter From a UFCW 175 Safeway Striker,” The Chronicle-Journal, December 8, 2001. 
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or cars and so we all have heat and food.”** Pineau and Carr also believed that UFCW policies 
and procedures on the picket line were reasonable, since the union had already reduced the 
required twenty hours per week down to sixteen. Moreover, members with children were usually 
given the option of leaving the picket line at 3:00 pm.*’
To boost morale, Michael Fraser, Canadian director of the UFCW, asked its American 
members to support Thunder Bay workers in “any way they could show support and 
solidarity.”** Morale was further boosted by community leaders when, in December, Thunder 
Bay’s City Council sent a letter to Canada Safeway asking both parties to return to the 
negotiating table, because councilors felt the strike was affecting the city. Thunder Bay’s 
Chamber of Commerce likewise sent its own letter with a similar request.*"* Many members were 
appreciative of the community and union for showing support during the Christmas month. An 
Arthur Street picketer, for example, said the union received a lot of food and monetary support 
from the community to help workers through Christmas. The union also had collected several 
hundred Safeway Club cards returned by disaffected customers since the beginning of the strike, 
which it planned to send to Canada Safeway.** The union also held a successful Christmas 
dance, receiving various donations from other UFCW Locals, workers’ organizations such as the 
United Steelworkers of America and Canadian Labour Council, and private companies, 
including Molson, A&P, Carol’s Cakes, Loblaws, Kelseys, and Pepsi Cola, to name only a few.*® 
The lead up to the New Year was a particularly difficult time for the members of Local 
175 in Thunder Bay. Previous beliefs that the strike would be over before Christmas had been
Letter to the Editor, “Safeway strikers defend their union,” The Chronicle-Journal, February 18, 2002.
Ibid.
Kris Ketonen, “Safeway union looks for support from U.S. members,” The Chronicle-Journal, November 28, 
2001, A3.
4̂ UFCW Local 175, Union N ew s. December 10, 2001.
Kris Ketonen, “On Safeway line ‘morale’s good,”’ The Chronicle-Joumal, December 29, 2001, A L  
^  UFCW Local 175, Union N ew s. December 10, 2001.
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dashed, partially as a result of a decision made by the UFCW in Manitoba to avert a strike 
through arbitration. While the union leadership understood the labour laws in Manitoba and 
Ontario, the membership did not, leading some members to believe that the UFCW leaders had 
purposely lied to the membership to force a strike vote against the company. A small minority of 
union critics began to create dissent on the picket line, which slowly spread into the community. 
Union critics believed that the union leadership needed to address many issues, including the 
rigid picket line schedule, strike pay for part-time workers, and minor cases of discrimination 
against those members who did not share the union’s views. Nevertheless, the union continued 
to enjoy the support of the majority of UFCW members and community. Messages of solidarity 
from other organizations and Locals across the country, coupled with the support of community 
members and leaders, encouraged Local 175 members and helped boost morale on the picket 
lines.
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Chapter 3:
A: Lead up to the “Last, Best, and Final Offer”
Aware of the growing division on the picket line, Canada Safeway became more
aggressive in its attempts to cause dissension among union members in the hope of gaining
concessions from its Thunder Bay employees. Following through on a previous threat to close
the MacDonald’s Consolidated Warehouse Facility, the company terminated all forty-three
workers, including thirty-five UFCW members, effective March 16, 2002. Toby Oswald, a
Canada Safeway Spokeswoman, argued that it would be
more economical for the company to serve Northwestern Ontario from its Winnipeg store. 
We had an opportunity during the strike to evaluate it and found it to be outdated. You 
have to decide whether to renovate or move to another location that can accommodate your 
business. We regret having to take this action which will have a direct impact on a number 
of our Ontario employees.*
Meeting its minimum obligations, Canada Safeway offered severance packages to all its
employees consistent with the UFCW agreement and the Ontario Employment Standards Act.
Criticizing the company for doing the “bare minimum,” Bob Linton, a UFCW representative,
argued it was callous of Safeway “to do it at this time in the midst of a labour dispute.” He
believed the company should have increased its severance package, from one week for every
year worked to a maximum of 26 weeks, to “three weeks for every year worked.”’
The closure of the Waterloo Street warehouse caused further debate in the Thunder Bay
community. An editorial, “Closure is callous,” published in The Chronicle-Journal on January
21, 2002, condemned the closure of the Waterloo Street warehouse and contended that
' Jim Kelly, “43 lose jobs at warehouse Safeway closes Waterloo facility,” The Chronicle-Journal, January 18, 
2002, A l.
 ̂Ibid. During the interview process, most participants were not surprised that Canada Safeway closed the Waterloo 
Street warehouse, believing that it had been slated to close for years. One member believed that the warehouse 
workers would have been employed for maybe a couple o f more years had the strike not occurred but that their 
layoffs was just a matter o f time.
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It is easy to view the closure as a tactic that’s intended to send a message to the workers; 
accept the company’s final offer or we’ll sell the stores out from under you, too. If it is a 
tactic, it’s a dirty one for people on a winter picket line. If, not, it’s an extremely poorly 
timed business decision that Safeway executives know full well will be seen as a tactic by 
the union, and many in the public at large.*
The ideas expressed in the editorial received mixed responses from the community. Ernie Epp,
President of the Thunder Bay-Superior North NDP Riding Association, wrote on behalf of the
executive to express support for the Safeway workers in their struggle with their employer,
Canada Safeway. Condemning Canada Safeway, he argued that “the callousness of your
employer is becoming clear to all of us. The editorial in The Chronicle-Joumal Jan. 21 (“Closure
is callous”) underscores the truth of these assertions.”* The closure of the warehouse was just one
more tactic employed by Canada Safeway to pressure UFCW members into accepting its
proposal. Comments condemning Canada Safeway’s policies by community members such as
Ernie Epp, were arguably well founded and provided UFCW members with the encouragement
they needed to continue the strike.
Disagreeing with the editorial, “Closure is callous,” an anonymous member of the 
community argued the Canada Safeway decision to close the warehouse was legitimate. The 
writer reasoned that
A corporate entity is... driven by economic forces that require actions that will allow it to 
be profitable in the present time and viable in the future.... It is unlikely that any research- 
based decisions were made by the union in convincing the members to strike. Had they 
analyzed the present market and the future path of the retail community, they would have 
known that now was not the time to strike.
The anonymous writer came under attack, however, as one UFCW member, Kristine Boon,
defended the actions of her union. She chastised the writer for remaining anonymous, contending
that “this is not the first time we have heard anti-union propaganda from these nameless.
 ̂Editorial, “Closure is callous,” The Chronicle-Joumal, January 21, 2002.
4 Letters to the Editor, “Two views of the Safeway strike,” The Chronicle-Journal, January 30, 2002. 
 ̂ Ibid.
R eproduced  with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission.
45
faceless, gutless mud-rakers.”  ̂Unlike the anonymous writer, who believed union leaders should 
be “formally educated in business and knowledgeable about the economic forces that drive 
companies,”  ̂Boon defended union leaders by stating that they had “representation from people 
with years of experience working the same retail environment our members now occupy.... The 
representatives also continue their attempts to bring the company back to the bargaining table.”® 
Boon’s pro-union sentiments and condemnation of the union critics, demonstrated the growing 
division within the union ranks, and the emotional turmoil UFCW members had suffered since 
the beginning of the strike.
Whereas some members continued to criticize the UFCW leadership, the union continued 
to enjoy some support in the community and from other workers’ organizations. Members of 
Industrial Wood and Allied Workers of Canada Local 2693, left their own picket site at 
Industrial Hardwood Products on Mission Island to join the UFCW members at the Arthur St. 
location.^ Likewise, a visit by Wayne Samuelson, President of the Ontario Federation of Labour, 
in late February was received with applause by some members of the UFCW and hailed with 
thanks by the UFCW leadership. Colby Flank, a UFCW representative, maintained that morale 
on the picket line was “upbeat.” The UFCW was also hoping that “displays of solidarity from 
other UFCW locals across Canada” would help restart negotiations with Canada Safeway.
Other UFCW locals responded to UFCW Local 175’s request by doing their own fundraising to 
help the Thunder Bay employees. Kevin Shimmin, a union representative, for example, said that
® Letter to the Editor, “Who are cowards bashing our union Re: Two views o f the Safeway strike,” The Chronicle- 
Joum al, February 2, 2002.
 ̂Letters to the Editor, “Two views o f the Safeway strike”
* Letter to the Editor, “Who are cowards bashing our union Re: Two views o f  the Safeway strike”
® Sandi Krasowski, “IWA shows support,” The Chronicle-Journal, February 7, 2002.
Kris Ketonen, “Safeway workers get a lift from labour leader,” The Chronicle-Journal, February 28, 2002, A3.
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other locals in the province had helped members financially to make sure that members were 
able to make their mortgage payments.'^
After nearly seven months on strike, the UFCW leadership continued to be supported by 
the membership and the community. Canada Safeway’s aggressive tactics were criticized by the 
community and members. Their criticisms of the company nevertheless were offset by some 
community members who began to express dissatisfaction with the union leadership and the 
prolonged nature of the strike.
B: Canada Safeway’s Last, Best and Final Offer
The arbitrated agreement between Canada Safeway and UFCW Local 832 Manitoba in
April 2002 shifted the momentum of the strike in the company’s favour and provided fuel for
union critics. The new agreement was a leading factor in the company’s decision to pursue new
negotiations with UFCW in Thunder Bay. Arbitrator William Hamilton “denied Safeway the
major wage and benefit decreases they were seeking and awarded some wage increases,” but he
nevertheless granted a number of important concessions to the company. He established,
A new tier wage rate for new employees hired after April 1, 2002, and also moved the 
Trainees into this category.... The Arbitrator also agreed with the Company’s proposal in 
regard to Counter-ready M eat... but allowed [the meat cutters] to bump into other 
departments.^^
The elimination of the meat department workers through the introduction of counter-ready meat 
had been a key issue leading the UFCW to reject the company’s proposal in Thunder Bay in 
October 2001. The proposal had specified that the company would not introduce pre-packaged
Kris Ketonen, “UFCW Locals aid Safeway em ployees,” The Chronicle-Journal, March 26, 2002, AlO.
A  Manitoba agreement, settled by W illiam Hamilton an arbitrator, in 2002, provided that “Existing health and 
welfare benefits, which the Company wanted eliminated in some instances and drastically reduced by reducing the 
funding, have been maintained by the Arbitrator. In fact, the Arbitrator increased the Company’s contributions to the 
Health and Welfare Group Insurance Plan, the Pension Plan as well as the Education and Training Trust Fund.” The 
term o f the award was for only two years, expiring on November 9, 2003. William H. Hamilton, Summary o f  
Arbitration Award. Canada Safeway Limited and UFCW Local 832, April 30, 2002.
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meat until the conclusion of negotiations in Manitoba. Having won concessions through 
arbitration in Manitoba, especially regarding the elimination of the meat department, Canada 
Safeway felt confident that it could gain further concessions from its Thunder Bay employees. 
This led the company to reopen negotiations with the UFCW.
Company negotiators and union leaders decided, however, that negotiations between the 
union and company in Thunder Bay would best be kept silent. The Chronicle-Journal 
nonetheless acquired a letter from Jim Witiuk, Canada Safeway’s Director of Labour Relations, 
that invited the UFCW to “attempt to reach a conclusion” to the ongoing strike. Maintaining 
Canada Safeway’s earlier position, he stated in the letter that “any solution to the strike in 
Thunder Bay must deal with Thunder Bay realities, which includes the cost of the strike, the cost 
of maintaining the stores unopened during the dispute and the loss of sales.” '^ Considering the 
company’s proposal, which offered no improvements to the original contract put forward in 
September 2001, talks ended rather quickly, with the UFCW leadership walking out of 
negotiations after only nine hours. John Fuller, a UFCW negotiator and representative, stated that 
he did not think the parties were any closer to settling a contract than they had been six months 
earlier.
The company, however, made it clear that it intended to bring the “final offer” to the 
union membership in a government-supervised vote.*^ The Ontario Labour Relations Act 
provides under section 41 that employees in a bargaining unit shall “be given the opportunity to 
accept or reject the offer of the employer’s last received by the trade union.”'^ Pushing ahead on 
its “Last, Best and Final Offer,” Canada Safeway forwarded a copy of its offer to the UFCW and
Ward Holland, “Safeway, union meet,” The Chronicle-Journal April 20, 2002, A3.
“* Ward Holland, “Safeway-UFCW talks fail,” The Chronicle-Journal, April 21, 2002, A3.
Ibid.
Ontario Labour Relations Act, 1995, section 4L  Section 41 is just one labour law that is anti-union in design. It 
postulates that the employer best understands employee concerns rather than the union that represents them.
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its members to facilitate the vote that the Ontario Ministry of Labour wanted to conduct on May
7, 2002. In a letter to all its former Thunder Bay employees, dated April 22, 2002, Chuck
Mulvenna, the President and Chief Executive Officer of Canada Safeway, argued that the
Offer is fair and provides for improvements with minimal impact on current employees. If 
the Offer is accepted by you, our employees, we will immediately begin steps to reopen for 
business and recall our employees to work. However, if  the Offer is rejected in the Final 
Offer Vote conducted by the Government, we have advised the Union that we will exit the 
market by permanently closing our stores. The decision is yours.
The latter represented a clear threat to the UFCW membership, as store closures would cost
everyone their jobs. The proposed contract aimed to implement a number of items that would be
detrimental to the employees. It was designed, as UFCW representatives stated, to make the
employees pay for the loss of sales that Canada Safeway had suffered during the ongoing labour
dispute.^®
Among the more controversial issues was the company’s plan to implement a four year 
collective agreement, compared with previous agreements that had lasted only two years. Such a 
proposal would lend Canada Safeway time to recoup some of the financial losses it had suffered 
during the strike. In an attempt to introduce a number of cost saving measures, the company 
sought to implement a new tier III wage scale for part-time workers hired after the date of 
ratification. The introduction of a new tier wage scale would have divided the part-time workers 
into three categories. Tier III part-time workers were slated to earn from $6.85 to $12.50 
compared with previous wage scales of $6.85 to $12.80 for tier II part-time workers.^° Tier III 
workers were also going to be given precedence for hours over tier I part-time workers and tier II 
part-time workers following ratification of the agreement; as outlined in the offer “the priority
Chuck Mulvenna, “Negotiation Report,” Canada Safeway Limited, April 22, 2002.
Ward Holland, “Safeway-UFCW talks fail,” The Chronicle-Journal, April 21, 2002, A3.
“Last Best and Final Company Offer in the Matter o f a Collective Agreement between Canada Safeway Limited, 
Thunder Bay, Ontario and United Food and Commercial Workers, Local 175,” April 22, 2002.
Ibid; 8.
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for scheduling will be Full Time, Tier III part-time and finally Tier II Part Time. This means that 
Tier I, Tier II part-time or full time employees will have no claim on any hours created by the 
buyout and allocated to Tier III employees.” *̂ The current part-time employees saw the 
introduction of a new part-time tier wage scale as a threat to their current scheduling practice and 
the number of hours they were slated to receive, causing many part-timers to reject the Final 
Offer.
The contract was largely designed to make Tier I, II and III part-time employees pay for 
the expenses that had occurred as a result of the strike. Besides the new lower wage bracket for 
Tier III part-time workers. Tier I and II part-time workers were limited to a mere 6% and 8% in 
vacation pay, while Tier III part-time workers were limited to the provincial statutory minimums 
of 4% .^ Moreover, the company sought to reduce sick leave from 148 hours to 48 hours for all 
new full-time employees hired after the date of ratification.^^
The company also sought to reduce the number of senior part-time and full-time 
employees by offering them buyout packages. Employees who had accepted the buyout package 
and resigned but who wished to return to Canada Safeway for employment would waive “any 
previous experience credit under the agreement,” forcing them to be rehired under the Tier III 
part-time wage s c a l e . A  clause in the contract also gave the company the powers to force senior 
part-time and full-time employees to accept the buyout package; the proposal specifically stated 
that:
Some full time jobs may not be required upon return to work because of lost volume. The 
parties herein agree that any contractual or legislated notice is deemed provided by the
Ibid. 
Ibid; 2.
23 Ibid. Canada Safe way’s full-time workers worked on average 35-40 hours per week.
Ibid; 9.
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ratification of this agreement except that the Company will provide full time employees 
two weeks notice of reduction to part time in accordance with the collective agreement.
The latter proposal was designed to reduce the number of higher paid employees. The expected
increase in the number of part-time workers led the company to change the part-time maximum
number of hours from 24 hours per week to 30 hours. New employees hired after the date o f
ratification were likewise required to work on Sunday and any other scheduled shift, regardless
of availability, compared to previous contracts which employed workers on Sunday on a
voluntary basis.^
Besides an increase in the number of hours for all part-time employees, Canada Safeway 
also provided a lump sum payment to full and part-time employees who reported to work after 
the ratification of the agreement. Other lump sum payments of one hundred to five hundred 
dollars were to follow on September 8, 2002, September 13, 2003 and September 11, 2004.^^ 
Meat Managers, Meat Cutters and Meat Wrappers, remained on the proverbial chopping block, 
pending the implementation of counter-ready meat, but were given the option of either accepting 
a buyout package or bumping another full or part-time junior employee to retain their full-time 
status.^® After nearly eight months of walking the picket line and with support for the UFCW 
dwindling, Canada Safeway negotiators believed that their offer would be accepted by the 
membership regardless of the proposals because the majority of workers, in their opinion, 
wanted to end the strike.
To sell the final offer to the membership, Canada Safeway hosted a meeting at the Italian 





R eproduced  with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission.
51
questions freely.”^̂  Chuck Mulvenna attended the meeting with the idea that he would be able to 
answer the members’ questions. His presence, however, only inflamed an already hostile crowd, 
since he proved unable to answer any questions effectively. The company would have been 
better off had it sent someone to Thunder Bay who knew the issues involved in the strike, such 
as Jim Witiulk or Tobay Oswald-Felker, two representatives of Canada Safeway. Canada 
Safeway’s message that a no vote means “no lump sums, no buyouts, and no severance.... You 
eliminate the opportunity for your co-workers to receive the lump sums or buyouts,” ”̂ poured 
fuel on the fire for those members who viewed Canada Safeway as the aggressor in the strike.
Besides criticism from union-supporters during the meeting, Mulvenna was also seen as 
damaging the company cause by those who supported the company. One critic said that “we 
would have been better if [Mulvenna] hadn’t com e... he should have just given his presentation 
and that was it.... When everyone started asking him questions, he couldn’t really answer us, he 
wasn’t really well informed.” *̂ Still others commented about the lack of organization and 
direction at the meeting, criticizing the company for allowing members to be too free with their 
questions and comments.^^ While a large number of members vocally opposed the offer, with 
some employees storming out of the meeting before it was over, others who spoke with 
Mulvenna after the meeting tended to be more receptive towards the company’s offer.
Kris Ketonen, “Safeway, union gear up for vote,” The Chronicle-Journal, May 3, 2002, A3.
^  Jim Kelly, “Safeway makes its pitch: Strikers pan company’s offer,” The Chronicle-Journal, May 4, 2002, A t.
Interview 4A, 2006.
Ibid.
The media and UFCW representatives were not allowed to attend the meeting, but The Chronicle-Journal 
reported that “while most o f  the em ployees sat through about three hours o f  the company’s presentation many 
stormed out o f the meeting long before it was over. Some, anger spilling across their faces, were seen discarding the 
12 page final offer in nearby garbage cans. ‘Shut the stores down and let us get on with our lives,’ said one man who 
refused to give his name. ‘Safeway workers are getting screwed,’ yelled a woman. ‘The mood in that room is angry,’ 
said another woman. A  union official from Toronto, who was not allowed in the meetings, said he sensed that 
employees were bitter.” Jim Kelly, “Safeway makes its pitch: Strikers pan company’s offer,” The Chronicle- 
Journal, May 4, 2002, A l.
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In the interlude leading up to the vote on the Final Offer, Canada Safeway made clear that
a no vote meant “no lump sums, no buyouts and no severance.” Reeling from the disastrous
meeting on May 3"̂ ,̂ the company sent out a video of Chuck Mulveena explaining the offer in
more detail in the hope that it would answer a number of questions that he had been incapable of
answering at the company meeting. One of the things he attempted to clarify was the company’s
introduction of a new tier III part-time workforce. According to Mulvenna, tier III part-time
employees would only be scheduled with the “bought hours” the company gained from those
who accepted the buyout packages;
Bought hours will always be calculated as a percent of hours in a given department at the 
conclusion of the buyout. The means that if the bought hours plus attrition equals ten 
percent of the hours in the produce department the new tier will be scheduled no more than 
ten percent of the scheduled hours, regardless if the total number of hours increases or 
decreases with changes in sales.®'*
A plan to introduce tier III part-time employees was crucial to the company’s strategic plan to
deal with the economic consequences of the strike. A major concern for the company, according
to Mulvenna, was that Canada Safeway’s “ability to regain lost business and make a profit” had
been severely compromised by the strike.
Anger over the contract proposal gathered force on the picket line, as some members, 
including Colby Flank, a UFCW representative, called it a “piece of shit.” She contended that it 
was “extremely insulting to the members’” to think “that after seven months of being on strike 
this is what they think of the membership. You can’t even say it was an offer.”®® UFCW 
members responded in full force as about 150 pro-union members walked the picket line 
carrying UFCW flags or signs of protest that read, “Just Sell: Desperate but not Stupid,” and
Canada Safeway Ltd. Thunder Bay, ON. May, 2002. Video explaining the Last, Best, and Final Offer.
Kris Ketonen, “Anger brews on picket line: Safeway workers take aim at company’s stance, ” The Chronicle- 
Journal, April 26, 2002, A3.
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“Very Profitable Store for Sale.”®® Many members were particularly angered over Canada
Safeway’s statements that it would “liquidate” the Thunder Bay stores if UFCW members failed
to accept the company’s offer.®’
In a campaign to bolster support for the Union, Michael Fraser, the Canadian director of
the UFCW, wrote an open letter to the Editor of the Chronicle Journal defending the actions of
the union, specifically the representatives and negotiators in Thunder Bay. He contended that the
Negotiating committee worked very hard to reach a settlement with the company. This 
included a request to me to contact representatives of Safeway in the United States to see if 
we could avoid a strike.... On September 2 8 ,1 contact[ed] Lou Hogan, Vice President of 
Labour Relations for Canada Safeway and spoke to him about arranging a meeting in 
Thunder Bay. I was told that no one from Safeway was available to go to Thunder Bay.
The strike commenced Oct. 1.
Fraser criticized Steve Burd, the Chief Executive Officer of Safeway in California, for
prolonging the strike. Fraser contended that
After two weeks, on Oct. 15,1 had a meeting in Toronto with the President of Canada 
Safeway, Grant Hansen and the Senior Vice President of Industrial Relations for Safeway 
from California, David Faustman. In our discussions we reached a consensus on how to 
reach a settlement and end the strike.... The next day I received a phone call from David 
Faustman informing me the settlement we had discussed was not possible and Safeway 
wanted even more concessions.... I believe this decision could only have been made by 
Steve Burd, the Chief Executive Officer of Safeway in California. Contrary to Safeway 
statements since Oct. 16, Safeway had never made any attempts to reach a settlement or 
meet with the union. The length of this strike can be totally attributed to the arrogance of 
the Safeway executive.
Michael Fraser’s defense of the UFCW and criticism of Canada Safeway was intended to clarify 
some of the rumours circulating on the picket line which pointed to the UFCW as the aggressor.
^  The UFCW  members were bolstered by about thirty striking members o f the Ontario Public Service Em ployees 
Union, who showed up on the picket line in solidarity. Ibid.
Kris Ketonen, “Safeway threatens to liquidate, union says,” The Chronicle-Journal April 22, 2002, A l. See also, 
Kris Ketonen, “Safeway confirms closure threat,” The Chronicle-Journal April 23, 2002, A l.
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Fraser hoped he could turn the tide of the strike, which had slowly been receding, in the UFCW’s 
favour.®®
The UFCW responded to the company’s threat to close the three stores by encouraging 
other grocery stores to buy the three Safeway stores, believing other employers would want to 
hire the current employees at Canada Safeway.®^ John Fuller, a UFCW representative, 
commented that other Canadian grocery store chains were interested in buying the Safeway 
stores, but he would not reveal which chains were interested.'*® Toby Oswald-Felker, 
Spokeswoman for Canada Safeway, contradicted such claims, asserting that no other companies 
had expressed interest in acquiring Safeway stores in Thunder Bay. She stated that the stores 
would more likely “join the more than 400 non-operating sites in North America;” they would 
then be the responsibility of Canada Safeway’s real estate department.'**
Although there appeared to be many opponents of Canada Safeway’s Final Offer, there 
still remained a small number of outspoken UFCW members who were critical of the union and 
who supported Canada Safeway’s proposal. They believed that enough of the members 
supported the company’s offer to win the contract vote. The experiences of the union critics 
leading into the vote was very different from those who supported the membership as they found 
themselves targeted by some of the union supporters for supporting the Final Offer.
In one incident, union critics were harassed at the Brew Pub, a Thunder Bay restaurant 
and bar, where they had reserved a private room to discuss Chuck Mulvenna’s speech to the 
membership leading into the contract vote for the Final Offer. A number of union supporters 
interrupted the evening and attempted to intimidate and harass those who supported Final Offer.
Michael Fraser, “Letter to the Editor,” The Chronicle-Journal April 27, 2002.
Kris Ketonen, “Safeway confirms closure threat,” The Chronicle-Journal April 23, 2002, A l.
Kris Ketonen, “Safeway, union grear up for vote,” The Chronicle-Journal, May 3, 2002, A3.
Kris Ketonen, “Safeway still thinking of closures in Thunder Bay,” The Chronicle-Journal, May 1, 2002, A3.
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Union supporters forcefully and aggressively pounded “against the glass wall to the restaurant 
immediately adjacent to where the group of ‘Safeway employees’ were dining” while shouting 
harassing and abusive comments. One union supporter shoved another union member. Union 
supporters took pictures of dissidents meeting at the Brew Pub. Only after restaurant 
management and staff asked the troublemakers to leave and called the police were company 
supporters able to leave the restaurant. Union critics expressed fear that there would be further 
retaliation, requesting that the police escort them to their vehicles; no one, however, pressed 
charges.'*^
Union representatives, while denying that any intimidation or harassment took place at 
the Brew Pub, admitted the union supporters had come to the Lakehead Labour Centre to advise 
“the Union that the company managers were buying drinks for the employees at the Pub.”'*® They 
further argued that while “the camera may have flashed on one occasion there was in fact no film 
in the camera; the police came to the location, satisfied themselves that nothing was the matter 
and left without asking anyone to leave or laying any charges.”'*'* While union representatives 
downplayed the incident, the fact that the Brew Pub’s management had to request union 
supporters to leave and felt obliged to call the police, leaves little doubt the UFCW members 
engaged in some forms of intimidation and harassment.
The incident at the Brew Pub was only part of the ongoing dispute between those who 
supported the union and those who criticized the union and its policies. Both sides remained
Labour Relations Act, 1995. Amended Application Under Section 74 o f the Act (Union’s Duty o f Fair 
Representation). Before the Ontario Labour Relations Board. Between; Mary Hembruff, Vanda Bernaudo, Helene 
Drebit, Cindy Normand, Donna Fortes, Lori Berringer, Susan W ojciechowski, Frank Nasr, Mena Lopez-George and 
Leena Kopenen Applicant, and United Food & Commercial Workers Union, Local 175, Colby Flank, Sharon Gall, 
Mike Fraser, John Fuller and Wayne Hanely. Responding Party.
Labour Relations Act, 1995. Response to Application Under Section 96 of the Act (Unfair Labour Practice). 
Before the Ontario Labour Relations Board Between: Mary Humbruff, Vanda Bernaudo, Helene Drebit and Cindy 
Normand and Applicant: United Food & Commercial Workers, Local 175, Colby Flank, Sharon Gall, Mike Fraser, 
John Fuller and Wayne Hanely, 11.
Ibid.
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confrontational as the vote loomed closer. A union meeting held on May 5*® to explain the offer 
to the membership, for example, led to further abuses by union representatives. UFCW 
representative, John Fuller presiding over the meeting, had previously expressed his desire to 
hear from all members at the meeting, regardless of their opinions; in a letter to the membership, 
dated April 25, he acknowledged the division afflicting the community and picket line, 
contending that
We know there is a lot of public attention surrounding this issue -  pro and con. Whether it 
be in the form of written media, radio or television media, letter to the editor (pro or con), 
or other types, we encourage you to come out to your meeting and review your issues as a 
bargaining group of employees. We should all hear what you and your co-workers have to 
say. It is well and good for other members of the public to offer their opinion, pro or con, 
but what really matters is the decision of your bargaining unit.'*®
He appeared to change his mind as the vote drew near, however, and this led him to regulate the
meeting. Unlike the Canada Safeway meeting, for example, where everyone, regardless of their
allegiances, spoke up. Fuller was quick to chastise anyone who spoke against the union and its
policies.'*® One union critic left the union hall disgusted by the proceedings, only to be taunted by
union supporters who clapped their hands and responded “good riddance.”'*’
The union, meanwhile, attempted to boost morale by using some of the more prominent
union supporters to help strengthen the members’ morale. Karen Wyder, an outspoken proponent
of the UFCW, spoke to the crowd, fervently defending the union and criticizing the Last, Best
and Final Offer and its supporters. She staunchly defended the union, saying that “Without the
Union there would be NOTHING! The UNION was created because of COMPANIES LIKE
SAFEWAY! The Union was created to protect and service the rights of the employees! United
John Fuller, Information Update for UFCW Local 175 Members at Safeway -  Thunder Bay, April 25, 2002.
^  Interview 4A, 2006. See also Labour Relations Act, 1995. Amended Application Under Section 74 o f  the Act 
(Union’s Duty o f Fair Representation). Before the Ontario Labour Relations Board. Between: Mary Hembruff, 
Vanda Bernaudo, Helene Drebit, Cindy Normand, Donna Fortes, Lori Berringer, Susan W ojciechowski, Frank Nasr, 
Mena Lopez-George and Leena Kopenen Applicant, and United Food & Commercial Workers Union, Local 175, 
Colby Flank, Sharon Gall, Mike Fraser, John Fuller and Wayne Hanely. Responding Party.
Interview 4A, 2006.
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we STAND!”'*® Her condemnation of the company’s offer was comparable to the executioner 
waiting to execute his prisoner; “If you agree to this so called offer, you might as well hang 
yourself, because this company has gone to great lengths, and great language, to make sure that 
the noose is tightly around your neck!”'*® She pinpointed a number of issues that were 
detrimental to the employees, including the company’s discretion in choosing which employees 
were needed to resume operations and which employees were not, and the power the contract 
provided in allowing the company to lay off workers who were not given hours within four 
weeks after the date of ratification.®® Wyder further commented that at “least with a NO VOTE 
the company will have to pay me severance because the Labor Relations Board specifies they 
have to be accountable. With them behind me, at least I will have a guarantee!”®* Her speech was 
supported by a number of union supporters and the UFCW leadership for highlighting the 
detrimental policies in the new contract proposal as well as the benefits of rejecting the offer, 
such as receiving severance pay.
Severance pay became a major issue leading into the vote on the Final Offer. The UFCW 
leadership told its members that the company was required to pay severance according to the 
Employment Standards Act.®’ Canada Safeway, however, argued “that severance pay would not 
be owing if the stores close [d],” stating that “severance pay is not owing when a closure results 
from the economic consequences of a strike.”®® Mulvenna’s attempts to clarify the issue by





Some interviewees stated that the UFCW leadership promised its members that it would get its members 
severance pay. Group Interview, March 15, 2006. In other interviews, the interviewee believed that Canada Safeway  
was required to pay its members severance according to the Labour Relations Act/Employment Standards Act. 
Interview 3A, 2006 and Karen Wyder, Interview 5A, 2006.
Canada Safeway memo to UFCW members o f frequently asked questions regarding the Last, Best, and Final 
Offer, April 29, 2002, 2.
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exposing the myth that the UFCW had been perpetuating to its members went largely unheeded 
because of his previous aggressive tactics. Union supporters viewed his statement that a no vote 
decision would result in no lump sums, no buyouts and “no severance” as just another threat the 
company was using to push a contract that was detrimental to the membership.®'* Members of 
Local 175 thus continued to believe the union. The union asked its members to calculate the 
number of hours they had worked leading into the strike in order to expedite severance packages 
in case the membership rejected the offer and were fired, leading members to believe severance 
pay would be owed if the stores closed.®®
Confusion surrounding severance pay stemmed largely from section 64, 1 a. and b., o f the 
Employment Standard Act, which stated
64. (1) An employer who severs an employment relationship with an employee shall pay 
severance pay to the employee if the empfoyee was employed by the employer for five 
years or more and,
(a) the severance occurred because of a permanent discontinuance of all or part of the 
employer’s business at an establishment and the employee is one of 50 or more employees 
who have their employment relationship severed within a six-month period as a result; or
(b) the employer has a payroll of $2.5 million or more. 2000, c. 41, s. 64 (1).®®
While Canada Safeway fulfilled the requirements of Section 64, it was nevertheless excused 
from paying severance due to Regulation 288/01, seetion 9(1) of the Employment Standards Act, 
which stated that employees are not entitled to severance pay under section 64 of the Act if “an 
employee whose employment is severed as a result of a permanent discontinuance of all or part 
of the employer’s business that the employer establishes was caused by the economic
4̂ Ibid. On May 6, 2002 Mulveena also sent a letter to all Safeway employees where he explained that “If the Offer 
is rejected, the stores will close. Under the law, em ployees on strike do not receive severance if  the closure results 
from the economic consequences o f the strike.” Chuck Mulvenna, Canada Safeway Limited, May 6, 2002.
Karen Wyder, Telephone Interview 5B, 2006. Karen Wyder was present at the union hall where she collected  
information for the UFCW regarding employee hours which were going to be used for the purpose o f  collecting  
severance pay.
Employment Standards Act, 2000 Section 64(1).
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consequences of a strike.” ’̂ Remarks by the UFCW and rumours circulating on the picket line 
were thus ill-founded. The union, all the same, either out of ignorance or as a deliberate act, was 
able to confuse the members, leading some members to vote against the Final Offer, in the belief 
that they would at least receive severance pay following a no vote. Karen Wyder’s speech at the 
Lakehead Labour Center to the UFCW membership was just one case where Sharon Gall and 
John Fuller, two UFCW representatives, failed to correct the misunderstanding surrounding 
severance pay, leading one to conclude that on balance the union misled the membership 
regarding this issue as they got closer to the vote.
C: Voting Day
The government-supervised vote, held at the Valhalla Inn on May 7, 2002, divided the 
union membership more, as members were forced to pick a side, either accepting the contract 
and aligning themselves with the union critics, or rejecting the offer and supporting Local 175 of 
the UFCW. Those who had originally supported the ideas presented in the material For Your 
Information now found a wider audience who expressed similar concerns about the union 
bureaucracy. An article published in The Chronicle-Journal on May 7, for example, discussed a 
“silent majority” who planned to vote in favor of the company’s Final Offer. Wishing to remain 
anonymous, the author contended that union officials from southern Ontario were unfamiliar 
with the realities of the “economic situation of Thunder Bay, and how hard it is to find a job.” 
Their biggest question was: “Where are people that have no education, no degrees, a lot of them 
middle aged, going to find a job that pays them $15 an hour?”®® Many of the senior part-time and 
full-time employees who had made a career with Canada Safeway retained numerous skills but
Employment Standards Act, 2000 Regulation 288/01 Section 9(1).
Kris Ketonen, “Safeway vote may be close: ‘Silent majority’ get their say today,” The Chronicle-Journal, May 7, 
2002, A l.
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feared that, without an education, they would have difficulty finding a job with similar pay and 
benefits.
In another act of defiance against the union, one member, who also wished to remain
anonymous, sent a letter to the editor of The Chronicle Journal expressing exasperation with the
strike. He or she argued that the
The meeting with the company on Friday night was at best a circus sideshow. The 
company sent the president, who could not answer many of the questions employees had, 
and a handful of employees clearly attended the meeting to heckle the company and any 
employees who are still interested in working for Safeway. However, it is my opinion that 
we should accept the offer.®®
In the author’s view, many reasons existed to accept the company’s Final offer. Many employees
wanted to return to work, and those who did not should take the buyout and move on. The union
could also not guarantee that the stores would be bought by another grocery store chain.
Moreover, if employees returned to work for Canada Safeway, they would get a signing bonus,
whereas the company made it clear that no severance pay was owing to its employees.®®
In a show of defiance against Canada Safeway’s offer, the union gathered roughly a
hundred of its most vocal supporters to parade into the Valhalla Inn wearing anti-Safeway T-
shirts, carrying the UFCW flag, and singing “na, na, na, na, na. Hey, Hey, Goodbye!,” a song
entitled “Kiss Her Goodbye,” covered by the Nylons.®* Led by Sharon Gall, the UFCW regional
director, and accompanied by the same UFCW members who had intimidated and harassed
9̂ “Letters to the Editor,” The Chronicle-Journal, May 7, 2002, A6.
Ibid.
Karen Wyder, Telephone Interview 5B, 2006. See also. Labour Relations Act, 1995. Amended Application Under 
Section 74 o f the Act (Union’s Duty o f Fair Representation). Before the Ontario Labour Relations Board. Between: 
Mary Hembruff, Vanda Bernaudo, Helene Drebit, Cindy Normand, Donna Fortes, Lori Berringer, Susan 
W ojciechowski, Frank Nasr, Mena Lopez-George and Leena Kopenen Applicant, and United Food & Commercial 
Workers Union, Local 175, Colby Flank, Sharon Gall, M ike Fraser, John Fuller and Wayne Hanley. Responding 
Party, p. 4. See also. Labour Relations Act, 1995. Response to Application Under Section 96 o f the Act (Unfair 
Labour Practice). Before the Ontario Labour Relations Board Between: Mary Humbruff, Vanda Bernaudo, Helene 
Drebit and Cindy Normand and Applicant: United Food & Commerical Workers, Local 175, Colby Flank, Sharon 
Gall, Mike Fraser, John Fuller and Wayne Hanely, p. 12.
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union critics at the Brew Pub the previous Friday, the union was able to establish a dominant 
presence at the government-supervised vote. The wearing of anti-Safeway t-shirts was a visible 
reminder of the divisions afflicting the union membership. The presence of a large number of 
union supporters actively showing their allegiance by wearing anti-Safeway T-shirts was also 
perceived by some as threatening, leading some union-critics to perceive every stare or gesture 
as a hostile act. They contended, for example, that they had to make their way “through a wall of 
Union representatives while being subjected to insults, threats and gestures intended to 
intimidate... employees to vote against the offer out of fear.”®’ The union denied any such 
charges, arguing that members were met inside the hotel by both Canada Safeway and UFCW 
representatives and that government-appointed representatives were present to ensure that no 
harassment or intimidation took place.®®
Having cast their ballots, members waited with trepidation for the votes to be counted. 
The next day’s headlines, “Safeway Workers say no: 6 vote difference. Company won’t close 
city stores immediately, another vote sought,” caught most members by surprise. The UFCW 
declared victory over Canada Safeway, declaring in one union publieation that “the outcome was 
very close but the members rejected the offer by a margin of 201-195. The Company and the 
Dream Team members were stunned. They learned a hard lesson: solidarity is forever.”®'* 
Solidarity was nevertheless far from reality, as a six-vote difference clearly demonstrated the rift 
among the union membership.
Labour Relations Act, 1995. Amended Application Under Section 74 o f  the Act (Union’s Duty of Fair 
Representation). Before the Ontario Labour Relations Board. Between: Mary Hembruff, Vanda Bernaudo, Helene 
Drebit, Cindy Normand, Donna Fortes, Lori Berringer, Susan W ojciechowski, Frank Nasr, Mena Lopez-George and 
Leena Kopenen Applicant, and United Food & Commercial Workers Union, Local 175, Colby Flank, Sharon Gall, 
Mike Fraser, John Fuller and Wayne Hanely. Responding Party, p. 4.
“  Labour Relations Act, 1995. Response to Application Under Section 96 o f the Act (Unfair Labour Practice). 
Before the Ontario Labour Relations Board Between: Mary Humbruff, Vanda Bernaudo, Helene Drebit and Cindy 
Normand and Applicant: United Food & Commerical Workers, Local 175, Colby Flank, Sharon Gall, Mike Fraser, 
John Fuller and Wayne Hanley, p. 12.
^  Bill Trbovich, W e are here to STAY. 41.
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Realizing the membership was deeply divided, Canada Safeway’s President and Chief 
Operating Officer, Chuck Mulvenna, postponed closing the stores, contending that he did not 
think the vote represented the true wishes of the employees. Instead, he planned to ask the 
Ministry of Labour to conduct a second vote on the Final Offer.®® Mulvenna argued that the 
presence of UFCW members from Manitoba and Toronto on the picket lines and at the Valhalla 
Inn left some members feeling intimidated. The wearing of anti-Safeway T-shirts and the 
carrying of the UFCW flag created a hostile atmosphere for those who did not support the union 
and had planned to vote in favour of the Last, Best and Final Offer. He was concerned that “there 
may have been intimidation and undue influence exerted by the union in the conduct of the 
vote.”®® Whether or not Mulvenna believed members were intimidated into voting against the 
contract, he used the rift among the membership for his own agenda, which was to force the 
contract on the membership even though it had been rejected. Continuing with the company’s 
previous practice of using threats, Toby Oswald-Felker, Canada Safeway’s spokeswoman, 
likewise stated that the stores would close if the second vote was denied or the second vote was 
rejected by the membership.®’
The possibility that a second government-supervised vote could be held sparked debate in 
the Thunder Bay community. An editorial in The Chronicle Journal for example, stated the vote 
against the “Last, Best, and Final Offer must be respected for what it is -  the will of the 
majority.” Nevertheless, the editorial went on to question the practices of the UFCW leadership, 
believing there had been “growing signs of intimidation at work.... Employees have written to us 
asking to be published anonymously because they said they feared retribution from elements
Kelly Leydier, “Safeway Workers say no: 6-vote difference, Company won’t close city stores immediately. 
Another vote sought,” The Chronicle-Journal, May 8, 2002, A l.
“  Ibid.
Kris Ketonen, “Safeway applies for 2"‘* vote,” The Chronicle-Journal, May 10, 2002, A l.
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within their union.... This sort of guff is what continues to give some unions a bad name.”®® The
editorial argued that, while Canada Safeway had employed its own acts of intimidation by
threatening to close the stores if the Final Offer was not accepted, it was nevertheless correct in
seeking a second vote from the Ontario Ministry of Labour.®®
Not everyone agreed with the editorial, as some community members responded with
strong criticism of the company. Len Day, for example, regarded the company threat to close the
stores and the fact that it kept its employees out of work for eight months as a bigger act of
intimidation than anything the union was accused of having done. Day also stated that “I and
likely many others, will avoid Safeway like the plague because of the bad taste they have left in
our mouths.”’® Dorise Barrett, another community member, wrote an open letter to Grant
Hansen, President and CEO of Canada Safeway, expressing similar disgust with the company
and its policies during the strike. She chastised Hansen for treating Safeway employees “in such
a disgraceful manner.”’ * In her opinion, when
An employee with long-term standing is told that he/she will receive no severance unless 
they accept, economics and fear of unemployment become the ultimate priority and pride 
is put aside. Rest assured, I and other union supporters in Thunder Bay will not be 
shopping at your stores anywhere in this country.”
As a member of the community, her words weighed heavily compared to those of disgruntled
workers who chastised the company and its policies.
Barrett’s letter struck a cord with Chuck Mulvenna, the new President and CEO of Canada
Safeway, who responded with his own letter in The Chronicle-Journal. Mulvenna attempted to
clarify some of the “misleading information that the union has repeatedly communicated to
Ian Pattison, “Muddy tactics in Safeway vote,” The Chronicle-Journal, May 9, 2002, A6.68
® Ibid.
“Letters to the Editor,” The Chronicle-Journal, May 9, 2002, A7. 
“Letters to the Editor,” The Chronicle-Journal, May 10, 2002, A7. 
Ibid.
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Safeway employees and the public.”’® Addressing Ms. Barrett, he assured her that Canada 
Safeway treated its employees well and that they remained some of the highest paid workers in 
the industry. More important, he made clear that the company’s statements in October of 2001 
explaining that the offer would not improve if a strike occurred, was not said lightly or as a threat 
“but to give a truthful and clear understanding of the consequences of a strike.”’'* He further 
contended that the employees did not understand what they were doing by rejecting the Final 
Offer, stating that
The union misled them and then used intimidation to unduly influence the outcome of the 
vote. When the union presented our last, best and final offer to employees on May 5 before 
the supervised vote, the union executive suggested that it was not the final offer, that there 
would be more to come and that if the offer were rejected, further negotiations would be 
held. This even though the union had been told repeatedly that the last, best and final offer 
was indeed just that, our last, best and final, and if it was rejected the Safeway stores 
would close. Before the vote took place, the union brought supporters from out of town, in 
reality agitators to assist in influencing the striking employees. In one instance the police 
were called. In addition, the raucous display and the presence of many pickets, both 
outside and inside the voting venue was very intimidating and had no place in a 
government supervised vote.’®
Mulvenna further reminded members in the community such as Ms. Barrett that Canada Safeway
had been employing members of the Thunder Bay community since 1929, which it hoped to
continue to resume doing if a second government-supervised vote was held to express the true
wishes of the employees and produced acceptance of the company’s offer.
Len Day, Dorise Barrett, and others in the community who supported the union appeared 
to be a minority, as more individuals showed support for the company and expressed disdain for 
the union and its policies during the government-supervised vote. Adam Murray, for example, 
expressed disgust for those who rejected the offer, stating “I have been looking for work for 2 Vi 
months now, and would be quite happy to work for a company like Safeway, but now I may
92 “Letters to the Editor,” The Chronicle-Journal, May 16, 2002, p. A7. 
94 Ibid.
92 Ibid.
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never be given the chance.”’® Pat Blackwood, the wife of one of the Safeway strikers, made 
similar comments and brought home the realities the no vote had had on her family. For 
example, her family was now without retirement savings and it had lost its medical benefits. 
Contrary to UFCW statements that no one would lose their homes,”  Blackwood talked about 
how the families’ income, which was partially lost during the strike, was not enough to cover the 
cost of mortgage payments and other household expenses.’®
Discussions with the Ontario Ministry of Labour to conduct a second government 
supervised vote were nevertheless postponed, as Canada Safeway was informed by the Ministry 
of Labour that it had to take its case to the Ontario Labour Relations Board. According to Reg 
Pearson, Ministry Director of Labour Management Services, the accusations of intimidation filed 
against the UFCW fell under the “receipt of a judicial or quasi-judicial decision confirming your 
views as to the invalidity of the vote.” All parties during a Labour Relations Board hearing were 
obliged to present testimonies and were allowed to cross-examine testimony in the legal 
proceeding.’® Moving ahead to appear before the Labour Relations Board, Canada Safeway filed 
an application for a hearing to be set which, if accepted, would lead one step closer to a second 
government-supervised vote. A scheduled meeting with Kevin Whitaker, the Labour Board 
Chairman, on June 5, allowed both parties to present evidence in an informal hearing to ascertain 
whether or not the matter would go to a Labour Board hearing.®® Mr. Whitaker decided to move 
towards a Labour Board hearing, but such a process was lengthy; Voy Stelmaszynski, a Labour 
Board spokesman, stated the hearing could happen as late as September or October.
9® “Letters to the Editor,” The Chronicle-Journal, May, 10, 2002, A7.
99 Interview 4A, 2006.
9* “Letters to the Editor,” The Chronicle-Journal, May, 10, 2002, A7.
 ̂Kris Ketonen, “Safeway has to take new route for vote,” The Chronicle-Journal, May 16, 2002, A3.
80 Kris Ketonen, “Safeway, union to meet against with labour board,” The Chronicle-Journal, May 24, 2002, A3.
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The Ontario Labour Relations Board’s announcement that an official hearing and 
decision would not be made until the fall led the company to close the three Safeway stores on 
June 6, 2002, seemingly ending the careers of over 400 Safeway employees. Toby Oswald- 
Felker, Safeway’s vice-president of public affairs, noted the company “had asked for an 
immediate resolution for this issue. But the fact that now that possible resolution would be many 
months down the road meant that... we would just be incurring further losses.... Safeway’s 
business in Thunder Bay is dead.”®* While, on the one hand, Canada Safeway claimed its 
business in Thunder Bay was dead, it continued to play an active role in the ongoing dispute 
between the union critics and the UFCW. Oswald-Felker, for example, would not comment 
immediately on the future of the stores’ locations, stating only that the stores would be boarded 
up, signs taken down, and that they would join the other non-operating stores owned by Canada 
Safeway.®’ Affirming previous statements made in the media and to the UFCW members 
through letters, public announcements, and a video, Oswald-Felker stated there was no 
requirement to provide severance pay to the employees because the closure resulted from the 
consequences of a strike.
John Fuller, a UFCW spokesman, responded in turn, saying only that the union was 
planning to look into the matter of severance pay.®® In another statement, he pledged to fight the 
company’s assertion that the closure resulted because of the economic consequences of a strike, 
instead arguing the stores closed as a result of a business decision.®'* The UFCW particularly 
criticized the company for stating on the Employment Insurance forms that Safeway had closed 
as a result of a labour dispute. According to the union, this “had a negative impact on the
Kris Ketonen, “SAFEW AY CLOSES DOOORS Company’s business in Thunder Bay ‘is dead,’” The Chronicle-
Journal, June 7, 2002, A l.
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members’ Employment Insurance benefits applications.... The company could have stated: job 
loss due to store closure or anything else, but chose not to.”®® Nevertheless, the company’s 
choice of words reflected the realities of the strike and it would have been detrimental to the 
company had it chosen other wording, since the UFCW would have used such a declaration to 
force the company to pay severance. As it was, the UFCW was able to convince the federal 
government to provide Employment Insurance benefits to former Canada Safeway employees.
In the lead up to the Final Offer, Canada Safeway had adopted a more aggressive policy, 
partially resulting from the increased number of UFCW members who voiced opposition to the 
UFCW about prolonging the strike. The achievement of an agreement in Manitoba, which saw 
the introduction of counter-ready meat, provided further reason to push forward to the Final 
Offer. The new proposal put forward a number of issues which were detrimental to the UFCW 
membership but were designed by the company in the hope that they might be accepted, since 
support for continuing the strike had wavered. The behavior of a number of union supporters in 
the lead up to the Final Offer was perilously close to intimidation, leading the company to 
request that a second vote be taken on the offer after it was rejected by the membership by a six 
vote majority. The decision of the Ontario Labour Relations Board to reject a second vote left the 
company with two choices: continue the strike or close the stores to pressure the union into 
accepting another vote. Choosing the latter, the company used every tactic to block its employees 
from receiving any compensation, including Severance or Employment Insurance payments.
*2 Trobovich; 44.
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Chapter 4 
A: A Membership Divided 
As employees faced the reality of watching Canada Safeway board up the windows and 
take down the Safeway signs, union critics found wider support among UFCW Local 175 
members. While some members were relieved to end the strike after eight months, the majority 
of workers confronted the grim reality of trying to find another job that would pay as good a 
wage as Canada Safeway. Younger part-time workers found the transition easier, due to their age 
and the readiness to accept lower wages. Others, however, such as the senior part-time and full­
time workers who had spent twenty or more years working for the company were less confident 
about their future prospects. The union nevertheless planned to maintain the picket lines until the 
union deemed it “appropriate to take them down.”*
In an effort to save their jobs, a group of about twenty union members began to circulate 
a petition requesting the UFCW leadership to agree to a second government-supervised vote. 
Gary Nistico, a produce manager at Canada Safeway for thirty-one years, was one member who 
sought a second vote; he, like many others, felt saddened by the company’s closure, commenting 
that “it was like my dad died 11 years ago... and that hurt.”’ He, along with others, such as Jim 
Berlinquette, thought the union had misled employees about the offer with its claims that the 
stores could be sold or that members would receive severance. Their goal to reach 250 out of the 
480 UFCW members was a difficult task, according to Berlinquette, because many of the 
members were afraid of union retaliation; they could lose their union card, which would prohibit
' Kris Ketonen, “SAFEW AY CLOSES DOORS Company’s business in Thunder Bay ‘is dead,’” The Chronicle- 
Journal, June 7, 2002, A l.
2 Kris Ketonen, “Last-ditch fight for work: Group o f Safeway workers push for contract vote,” The Chronicle- 
Journal, June 10, 2002, A l.
R eproduced  with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission.
69
them from working at any grocery store unionized by the UFCW, including the Real Canadian 
Superstore and A&P.®
Those members who sought a second vote on the Last, Best and Final Offer received a 
boost of encouragement from the company when Chuck Mulvenna commented that if the UFCW 
accepted the company’s bid for a second vote, then the stores might reopen/ He cautioned 
members, however, stating that the company would only wait so long to see whether or not the 
union accepted the petitioning group’s offer.® Berlinquette and others were able to collect 241 
signatures, more than half the membership, requesting such a vote. The UFCW leadership was 
less than willing to accept another vote, however, even in light of a petition presented to them by 
the membership. John Fuller, a UFCW negotiator, argued that the group collecting the signatures 
intimidated other members into signing the petition, with some members “receiving up to 15 
phone calls.... Others said they were told the company would know who signed and who didn’t, 
and therefore feared retribution.”® He made the point further that the UFCW did not operate by 
petition. The two sides reached a compromise, however, and contacted Chuck Mulvenna to 
requested that Canada Safeway propose a similar contract to the ones agreed to in Fort Frances, 
Dryden and Kenora.’ Mulvenna refused, stating “we’ve gone as far as we can possibly go.”® 
Mulvenna’s decision to reject the offer was not surprising when one compared the 
Thunder Bay contract members worked under before the strike and the Fort Frances, Dryden and 
Kenora contract. While the Fort Frances, Dryden, and Kenora contract, which was settled in June 
2002, had introduced counter-ready meat, providing either a buyout for meat department
2 Ibid.
4 Kris Ketonen, “There’s hope for Safeway stores, company suggests,” The Chronicle Journal. June 11, 2002, A3. 
2 Kris Ketonen, “Up to union to act, Safeway chief says,” The Chronicle Journal. June 12, 2002.
 ̂Kris Ketonen, “UFCW sides reach agreement; Safeway holds fast,” The Chronicle Journal. June 13, 2002, A3.
9 Contract negotiations between Canada Safeway and the UFCW in Fort Francis, Dryden, and Kenora were being  
negotiated since late 2001. An agreement was finally reached in June 2002.
* Kris Ketonen, “UFCW sides reach agreement; Safeway holds fast,” The Chronicle-Journal, June 13, 2002, A3.
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employees or allowing them to bump other employees based on seniority, the wage difference 
remained too great for the company to accept. The company, for example, had only negotiated a 
second tier wage scale for part-time workers in FortFrances, Dryden and Kenora in June 2002. 
Tier II part-time employees still earned considerably more than the Thunder Bay Tier II 
employees. Tier II employees in Fort Frances, Dryden, and Kenora, for example, were slated to 
earn $7.20 to $14.35 for Sales/Service Clerks, and $8.00 to $16.75 for production staff, 
compared to the previous Thunder Bay wage rates of $6.85 to $12.50. Flad Canada Safeway 
accepted the deal, the company would have lost considerable profit considering that employees 
in Thunder Bay earned less per hour. It was highly unlikely the company would have provided a 
minimum thirty-five to eighty-five cent raise, let alone a maximum raise of $2.15 to $4.25.^ The 
wage disparity, however, also demonstrated the extent to which Canada Safeway had adopted an 
aggressive policy towards its employees in Thunder Bay by ensuring that its workers earned less 
than the other stores in the region.
Disheartened by the positions being taken by the union and the company, the petitioning
group presented the UFCW with a letter stating group members had retained legal counsel in an
effort to push ahead with a second government-supervised vote.'® Represented by a pro-business
firm, Weiler, Maloney, and Nelson, the petitioning group filed charges against the UFCW under
sections 96 and 74 of the Ontario Labour Relations Act. Section 74 stated that
A trade union or council of trade unions, so long as it continues to be entitled to represent 
employees in a bargaining unit, shall not act in a manner that is arbitrary, discriminatory or
® The contract provided for the introduction o f counter-ready meat, providing either a buyout for meat department 
employees or allowed them to bump another em ployee based on seniority. Canada Safeway also provided lump-sum  
payments to its full-time and part-time em ployees, o f  between $75 and $500. Moreover, the company sought to re­
structure the stores by offering buyout packages to employees in order to reduce its senior part-time and full-time 
staff. The new contract implemented a new tier-II part-time workforce, but the company maintained that it would 
respect seniority rights, giving preference to full-time and tier I employees. For further information see 
Memorandum of Agreement. In the matter o f a collective agreement between Canada Safeway Limited (Dryden, 
Kenora and Fort Frances Ontario) and United Food and Commercial Workers, Local 175. June 7, 2002.
‘“ Ibid.
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in bad faith in the representation of any of the employees in the unit, whether or not 
members of the trade union or of any constituent union of the council of trade unions, as 
the case may be."
The petitioning group cited a number of instances where the union had acted in an arbitrary and 
discriminatory manner, including the incident at the Brew Pub and the union supporters’ rally 
during the government-supervised vote on the Final Offer. They made particular reference to the 
UFCW representatives who were flown into Thunder Bay to intimidate members into rejecting 
the offer. They further argued that the union’s refusal to accept the petition for another vote was 
conducted in bad faith, contrary to section 74 of the Ontario Labour Relations Act.'^
While the company continued to keep its options open, remaining non-committal but 
generally supportive of the petitioning group. Local 175 members remained divided. In a new 
turn of events, the UFCW criticized Canada Safeway for not participating in a store closure 
program that was designed to help former Safeway employees find new jobs. Although the union 
had initiated some programs to improve basic computer skills, it sought additional help from the 
company in an effort to improve the program. The union planned to establish a training 
committee that would look into the job market and make recommendations and provide the
"  Section 74, Ontario Labour Relations Act. 1995. Section 96 states, “Where a labour relations officer is unable to 
effect a settlement o f  the matter complained o f  or where the Board in its discretion considers it advisable to dispense 
with an inquiry by a labour relations officer, the Board may inquire into the complaint o f a contravention o f  this Act 
and where the Board is satisfied that an employer, employers’ organization, trade union, council o f trade unions, 
person or employee has acted contrary to this Act it shall determine what, if  anything, the employer, em ployers’ 
organization, trade union, council o f trade unions, person or employee shall do or refrain from doing with respect 
thereto and such determination, without limiting the generality o f the foregoing may include, despite the provisions 
o f any collective agreement, any one or more of,
(a) an order directing the employer, em ployers’ organization, trade union, council o f trade unions, em ployee 
or other person to cease doing the act or acts complained of;
(b) an order directing the employer, em ployers’ organization, trade union, council o f  trade unions, em ployee 
or other person to rectify the act or acts complained of; or
(c) an order to reinstate in employment or hire the person or employee concerned, with or without 
compensation, or to compensate instead o f hiring or reinstatement for loss o f earnings or other employment benefits 
in an amount that may be assessed by the Board against the employer, employers’ organization, trade union, council 
o f trade unions, em ployee or other person jointly or severally. 1995, c. 1, Sched. A, s. 96 (4). Ibid.’’
Kris Ketonen, “Safeway Saga Over; N o hope seen for Thunder Bay stores to reopen,’’ The-Chronicle Journal, 
June 20, 2002, A1
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necessary training for individual members to be qualified to work in a particular industry. Chuck 
Mulvenna, however, stated that he was “not prepared under the circumstances to participate in 
the program,” but he would not explain why.'^
Defending Canada Safeway, the petitioning group criticized the UFCW in an open letter 
to the membership, arguing the company had already contributed to the store closure program by 
providing funds to the UFCW through the training and education fund that the 1987 collective 
agreement established. The training and education fund was used by the UFCW to fund training 
and education programs for union stewards and other union members. From 1987 to 1995, 
Canada Safeway contributed two cents per hour for each hour worked by all Safeway employees, 
and from January 1996 to 1997 it provided ten cents per hour, finally increasing its total 
contributions to fifteen cents per hour from 1997 to the beginning of the s trike .A cco rd ing  to 
Canada Safeway, it had contributed approximately $130,000 a year into the training and 
education fund before the strike, based on the number of employees and hours worked by 
Thunder Bay employees.'^
The training and education fund became a heated point of contention between the two 
groups. The petitioning group challenged the UFCW to be accountable for the funds, stating “We 
want to know that has happened to this Fund? We are wondering why the UFCW does not utilize 
this money to help all of the ex-employees that will now be required to find new employment?” 
The group further suggested the reason the UFCW pushed for a no vote during the Final Offer 
was because the union was slated to lose the resources the training and education fund provided 
to the union. Had a precedent been set in Thunder Bay, the union would have lost considerable
Kris Ketonen, “Safeway bows out o f effort to retrain ex-em ployees,” The Chronicle-Journal, June 21, 2002, A l.  
Letter to the membership: “Safeway Workers Believe Loss o f Contributions to Training and Education Fund by 
Safeway a Major Stumbling Block in UFCW Negotiations.” June 2002.
Chuck Mulvenna, Canada Safeway Video on the Last, Best, and Final Offer, May 2002.
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revenue as the training and education fund would most likely have been dropped from other 
contracts throughout Canada.'® Considering how the training and education fund provided a 
minimum of $130,000 a year to the UFCW from employees at Canada Safeway, the UFCW 
probably feared other companies such as the Atlantic & Pacific Company (A&P) would follow 
suit.
While the divisions on the picket line continued to grow, efforts to get a second
government-supervised vote on the Last, Best and Final Offer collapsed, as the Ontario Labour
Relations Board ruled that it would grant a hearing into the allegations the petitioning group
made against the UFCW under section 74, but it would not grant a second vote.'^ Mary Ellen
Cummings, in the decision released by the Board, declared that the Board did not possess the
jurisdiction to order another vote:
Even if the applicants were able to prove all of their allegations, the Board would not as a 
remedy, declare the vote to be of no force and effect. While the conduct engaged in by the 
responding parties, if proven, may well constitute a violation of section 76 which prohibits 
trade unions from seeking by intimidation or coercion to prevent persons from exercising 
rights under the Act, I am not satisfied that it was so egregious that it would have 
prevented employees from exercising their right to participate in a secret ballet vote and 
vote in accordance with their true wishes.'*
A hearing set by Cummings for October 30, 2002, into the allegations filed under section 74
created its own problems, as the petitioning group feared that it would be too late as Chuck
Mulvenna had made repeated statements that the company would only wait so long to consider
re-opening the Safeway stores.'® The members fears were quickly realized when Mulvenna
Letter to the membership: “Safeway Workers Believe Loss o f Contributions to Training and Education Fund by 
Safeway a Major Stumbling Block in UFCW Negotiations.” June 2002.
Jim Kelly, “Thunder Bay Safeway Workers have another setback,” The Chronicle-Journal, August 24, 2002, A l.  
Mary Ellen Cummings, Alternate Chair, Decision o f  the Board, August 21, 2002.
Kris Ketonen, “Little hope seen in Safeway m ove,” The Chronicle-Journal, August 29, 2002, A3.
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declared that the October 30‘® meeting was too far off for the company to wait any longer and the 
company would have to decide when to leave the city.^®
Faced with the possibility of losing any chance of the three stores reopening, the 
petitioning group, based on a recommendation by its lawyers, Weiler, Nelson, and Maloney, 
applied to decertify the UFCW as the Safeway employees’ bargaining agent. By decertifying the 
UFCW, the petitioning group hoped that it could either force the UFCW to accept a second 
government-supervised vote on the Final Offer or conduct a vote itself once the union was 
decertified.^' The Ontario Labour Relations Act required that at least forty per cent of the 
bargaining unit support the petition.^^ The petitioning group was certain, however, that it had 
enough support. Besides the petition signed by 241 members requesting a second vote on the 
Final Offer, some members believed sympathy had shifted on the picket lines to support the 
petitioning group.
Whereas union critics had remained a small minority on the picket line leading up to the 
government-supervised vote, often being taunted by union supporters, they emerged from the 
vote with more support from rank-and-file members who sought a resolution to the strike and a 
chance to regain their positions at Canada Safeway. One member described the shift on the 
picket line, saying that after the Last, Best and Final Offer “it was more divided.” Another 
member commented that the line changed; “the ones that supported the company got bigger and 
the ones that supported the union got smaller.” *̂ Cindy Normand, a spokeswomen for the
^  Kris Ketnoen, “Time Running out; Safeway’s future in Thunder Bay on the clock,” The Chronicle-Journal, 
August 30, 2002, A3.
Kris Ketonen, “N ew  Union soguht by Safeway workers,” The Chronicle-Journal, September 10, 2002, A l. 
Interview 4A, 2006.
Ibid. Section 63(5) o f  the Ontario Labour Relations Act states that “If the Board determines that 40  per cent or 
more o f  the em ployees in the bargaining unit appear to have expressed a wish not to be represented by the trade 
union at the time the application was filed, the Board shall direct that a representation vote be taken among the 
em ployees in the bargaining unit. 1995, c. 1, Sched. A, s. 63 (5).
^  Interview 4A, 2006.
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petitioning group, also commented that she was “certain the result would be different if a second 
vote is granted, as former workers have realized they’ll not likely get jobs as high paying as their 
position with Safeway, regardless of whether the city stores get sold.” '̂' The petitioning group’s 
attempt to decertify the UFCW led Canada Safeway to announce that it would not pull out of the 
city until after the decertification bid was resolved. This led more members to join the petitioning 
group in its efforts.^®
The Ontario Labour Relations Board scheduled a vote to decertify the UFCW as 
bargaining agent for the Safeway employees for September 26, 2002. Although the vote occurred 
on September 26, 2002, the ballots would remain sealed until an official hearing by the Ontario 
Labour Relations Board ruled on whether the vote was proper. The UFCW challenged the 
decertification vote, arguing that Safeway had fired all its Thunder Bay employees on June 6, 
2002, which would make the vote ineligible since none of the members were employed by 
Canada Safeway.^® Chuck Mulvenna, however, disagreed with the union’s interpretation of the 
situation, contending that the company would do its part to support the petitioning group by 
notifying all of its eligible employees about the vote to decertify the UFCW as the employees’ 
bargaining agent.^^
In an effort to expedite the vote, the petitioning group forwarded a letter to all Safeway 
employees in Thunder Bay explaining its agenda and the reasons members should vote to 
decertify the UFCW as their bargaining agent. The UFCW’s failure to accept the petition 
requesting a second vote, for example, left its members with little choice:
^  Kris Ketonen, “Little hope seen in Safeway m ove,” The Chronicle-Journal, August 29, 2002, A3.
^  Kris Ketonen, “N ew  road for Safeway chief: Company’s next move depends on decertification vote,” The 
Chronicle-Journal, September 17, 2002, A5.
^  Ibid. See also, Timothy Sargeant, J.A. Rundle and H. Peacock, Decision o f the Board. Ontario Labour Relations 
Board, file 2002 CanLII 39516, September 11, 2002.
Ibid.
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After the store closure many employees recognized the fact that the final offer was the best 
we could get from Safeway. We tried to get our union to recognize that fact, and let us re­
vote and accept that offer so we could still have our jobs. The UFCW would not. We must 
now seek another union to represent our wishes and present them to Safeway so they can 
re-consider closing their stores.^*
The letter promoting the decertification of the UFCW and the certification of a new union struck 
a chord among the rank and file members and led many members to support the union critics.
The union remained publicly optimistic in the days before the decertification vote. Victor 
Carrozzino, the director of the UFCW training and education centre, for example, contended that 
up to seventy per cent of the former employees had already found new jobs or retired. The union 
believed most members would not be interested in voting because they had moved on with their 
lives.^® The union’s leaders left nothing to chance, however, and sent a letter to the membership 
explaining what they considered to be the “correct facts” surrounding the decertification vote. 
The letter attacked the petitioning group and Canada Safeway, arguing that both had been mis­
informing the membership and the community.*® The union argued, for example, that the 
petitioning group had misled the membership by telling them that they could form another union. 
In a subsequent paragraph, the UFCW argued that it held the bargaining rights for the three 
Safeway stores in Thunder Bay, including successor bargaining rights if they were bought by 
another employer. The letter further stated that “if you vote to decertify, no other Union could 
even attempt to organize the stores and bargain a new collective agreement until Safeway or a 
new purchaser opened the stores and commenced business.”*' The UFCW successor rights were 
at jeopardy, however, because of the petitioning groups bid to decertify the union. Moreover, 
there was no guarantee that the UFCW would remain the bargaining agent of its members if  the
^  Handout to Safeway Employees, “What does de certify mean?”
^  Kris Ketonen, “Ex-Safeway Workers get on with lives,” The Chronicle-Journal, September 25, 2002, A3. 
^  Mail out by union, September 2002.
Ibid.
R eproduced  with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission.
77
stores were sold to another business. The Ontario Labour Relations Act stated in section 69 
paragraph 6 that
Where a business was sold to person who carries on one or more other businesses and a 
trade union or council of trade unions is the bargaining agent of the employees in any of 
the businesses and the person intermingles the employees of one of the businesses with 
those of another of the businesses, the Board may, upon the application of any person, 
trade union or council of trade unions concerned,
(a) declare that the person to whom the business was sold is no longer bound by the 
collective agreement referred to in subsection (2);
(b) determine whether the employees concerned constitute one or more appropriate 
bargaining units;
(c) declare which trade union, trade unions or council of trade unions, if
any, shall be the bargaining agent or agents for the employees in the unit or units; and
(d) amend, to such extent as the Board considers necessary, any certificate issued to 
any trade union or council of trade unions or any bargaining unit defined in any 
collective agreement.**
The UFCW might not have continued to represent Safeway employees had a new company
bought the stores from Canada Safeway, although the Labour Relations Board probably would
have maintained the successor bargaining rights if a similar retail store had purchased the
properties.
In another move to undermine the petitioning group, the UFCW leadership stated that it 
was “convinced Safeway is behind or working with the Group to decertify the Union and the 
Union has filed charges at the Ontario Labour Relations Board.”** They cited the fact that “every 
time the group dives in another direction; Safeway dives in after them.” The union, nonetheless, 
was only partially correct in its statements. Both the company and the petitioning group were 
well aware of the repercussions that a joint venture would have on their cause and therefore 
offered no assistance to each other, financially or otherwise. The Ontario Labour Relations Act 
prohibited the parties from seeking a joint effort under section 53 which stated that
32
Ibid.
Ontario Labour Relations Act, Section 69, paragraph 6.
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An agreement between an employer or an employers’ organization and a trade union shall 
be deemed not to be a collective agreement for the purposes of this Act if  an employer or 
employers’ organization participated in the formation or administration of the trade union 
or contributed financial or other support to the trade union. 1995, c. 1, Sched. A, s. 53.*''
The petitioning group appeared to be more aware of the Labour Relations Act than the UFCW,
and took every precaution not to join forces with company management or to seek financial
assistance from them.** Enough evidence exists, however, to demonstrate that Canada Safeway
used the petitioning group’s cause to drag out the strike in an effort to extract more concessions
from Thunder Bay employees. Although Chuck Mulvenna’s carefully worded statements in the
press helped to encourage members to support the petitioning group and its efforts to decertify
the union, there is no evidence of direct collusion between the petitioning group and the
company.
Whereas the UFCW believed it had enough support among the membership to retain its 
bargaining rights, Jim Berlinquette, one of the leaders of the petitioning group, viewed the 
situation differently. He believed that most former Safeway employees would vote to decertify 
the UFCW because “most of the jobs out there are part-time.”*® Besides the increased wages, 
compared to other retail sector jobs, Canada Safeway offered seniority rights and benefits.** One 
former employee was working three part-time minimum wage jobs to support his or her children. 
Like many others, the employee missed working for Canada Safeway and the opportunities the 
company provided. Besides wages, the company offered decent benefits and the opportunity to 
expand personal growth, something the employee could not find in any other part-time job.**
^  Ontario Labour Relations Act, section 53.
Interview 4A, 2006.
Kris Ketonen, “Ex-Safeway Workers get on with lives,” The Chronicle-Journal, September 25, 2002, A3. 
Ibid.
Interview 4A, 2006.
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Needing only forty per cent of the membership to vote to decertify the UFCW, Jim 
Berlinquette and others of the petitioning group remained optimistic that they had enough 
supporters. Of the 329 members who voted on September 26, 2002, Berlinquette commented that 
he thought at least 184 members voted to decertify the UFCW. Heidi Pineau, a union advocate, 
believed otherwise, contending that the vote would heavily oppose decertification. She also 
believed that the Labour Board would throw out the vote in October, since everyone voting had 
been fired on June 6, 2002, making the vote ineligible.*®
The petitioning group’s confidence that the UFCW would be decertified pushed it into 
forming its own association, the Safeway Workers’ Association. The group’s lawyers, Weiler, 
Nelson and Maloney, argued that the new association would regulate “labour relations between 
Canada Safeway Limited... and the employees of Canada Safeway Limited or such Successor 
Employer.”''® Specifically, the group sought to renew the old contract or seek a new collective 
agreement with Canada Safeway Limited. During an October 11* meeting, fifty UFCW 
members adopted the Safeway Workers’ Association Constitution. The Safeway Workers 
Association needed at least forty per cent or 184 members to sign union cards in order to secure 
the Ontario Labour Relations Board’s approval for a vote. Still, the association remained 
dependent on a decision of the Ontario Labour Relations Board decertifying the UFCW as the 
bargaining agent for Safeway employees.'"
Threatened by the Safeway Workers Association, the UFCW adopted a more aggressive 
stance, informing its members that those who joined the Safeway Workers’ Association would
Jim Kelly, “Good turnout for vote one UFCW decertification,” The Chronicle-Journal, September 27, 2002, A3. 
Constitution o f  the Safeway Workers’ Association, section 2, paragraph 2.1.
Kris Ketonen, “N ew  move to get vote; Ex-Safeway workers to form association,” The Chronicle-Journal, October 
11, 2002, p. A3.
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not be welcome on the picket line and would lose their strike pay.''* The petitioning group 
claimed, however, that members who joined the association were protected by confidentiality 
rights outlined in the Ontario Labour Relations Act. According to them, the act prohibited the 
UFCW from engaging in any acts of intimidation, coercion or pecuniary penalties on a person 
because they had filed an application under the Ontario Labour Relations Act. Section 87, 
paragraph 2, for example, states that
(2) No trade union, council of trade unions or person acting on behalf of a trade union 
or council of trade unions shall,
(a) discriminate against a person in regard to employment or a term or condition of 
employment; or
(b) intimidate or coerce or impose a pecuniary or other penalty on a person, 
because of a belief that the person may testify in a proceeding under this Act or because 
the person has made or is about to make a disclosure that may be required in a proceeding 
under this Act or because the person has made an application or filed a complaint under 
this Act or has participated in or is about to participate in a proceeding under this Act.
1995, c. 1, Sched. A, s. 87.''*
The UFCW maintained, however, that it was not discriminating against those members who
joined the association because they had filed to form a new association under the Ontario Labour
Relations Act, but rather because members had violated the United Food & Commercial Workers
International Union Constitution. Charged under sections 25(B)(4), 25(B)(5), 25(B)(11) and
25(B)(14) of the UFCW International Constitution, the members of the Safeway Workers’
Association took the matter to the Ontario Labour Relations Board.'''' They argued that the
UFCW international constitution did not apply to their case, because they were legally entitled to
Ibid.
Ontario Labour Relations Act, 1995, 87(2).
Mail out regarding charges filed against the forty Safeway Workers Association members, October 17, 2002. 
According to the UFCW leadership, those members who joined the Safeway Workers’ Association violated the 
UFCW International Constitution. The constitution stated in section Twenty-five that any member who advocated 
for withdrawal o f  a Local Union, accept membership in another union, violate their responsibility to the union, 
interfere with the contractual rights and obligations o f  the union, and violate any constitution or laws o f the 
international union, be subject to disciplinary proceedings. For further information see United Food and Commercial 
Workers International Union, CLC, AFL-CIO: Constitution As amended and revised at the Fourth Regular 
Convention, July 1998.
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form a new union without discrimination under section 87(2) of the Ontario Labour Relations
Act. Those members suspended likewise accused the UFCW of having sent representatives to the
meeting on October 11* to identify the members who joined the new association.''*
The Ontario Labour Relations Board commenced a hearing to announce the board’s
decision as to whether the bid to decertify the UFCW was eligible in early November. On
November 6, 2002, Kevin Whitaker for the board ruled the vote to decertify the UFCW was
ineligible. He ruled that no one was employed in the bargaining unit at the time of application.''®
A statement made by the board stated that
All authorities without exception support the UFCW’s submission that once an employee 
had had their employment relationship with the employer terminated or severed, they cease 
to be an employee for purposes of a termination application. There is not a single case 
cited where employees who have been terminated or severed have been found to be 
employees in the bargaining unit for purposes of a termination application.''*
Along with the denial of the decertification bid, Kevin Whitaker ruled that the UFCW charges
against Canada Safeway under section 96 of the act detailing unfair labour practices was a
“moot” point since the three Safeway stores were permanently closed on June 6, 2002 and the
bid to decertify the UFCW was dismissed.''* John Fuller, a UFCW spokesman, viewed the 
decision with mixed feelings. He did comment that the union would continue to pursue charges 
against the members who joined the Safeway Workers’ Association.''®
Although the decertification bid was denied, the Ontario Labour Relations Board 
postponed its verdict regarding those charges filed against the UFCW under section 96 of the
Kris Ketonen, “Strike pay suspended: UFCW members,” The Chronicle-Journal, October 24, 2002, A3.
^  Kris Ketonen, “Union hangs on to Safeway employees: Decertification bid denied,” The Chronicle-Journal, 
November 7, 2002, A l.
Decision o f the Board, November 6, 2002. Ontario Labour Relations Board, Docket 1732-01-U.
Kris Ketonen, “Union hangs on to Safeway employees: Decertification bid denied,” The Chronicle-Journal, 
November 7, 2002, A3.
''Ib id .
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Labour Relations Act. Mary Ellen Cummings, Alternate Chair presiding over the hearings,
summarized the charges;
First, the applicants allege that a number of individuals, acting on behalf of the union 
engaged in a course of conduct that was intended to intimidate and coerce employees into 
rejecting the employer’s offer in a Minister ordered vote, with the result that the outcome 
does not reflect the true wishes of the employees. Second, the applicants allege that the 
union breached its duty of fair representation to the members of the bargaining unit in 
failing to consider and act on a petition requesting that a new vote on the employer’s offer 
be scheduled. Third, the applicants allege that the union has penalized them for bringing 
this application by denying them access to strike pay and other monetary assistance.*®
As per the decision of the August 21, 2002 hearing, Cummings upheld the Board’s decision that,
even if it had the jurisdiction to grant a second vote, the petitioning group did not make out “a
prima facie or arguable case for such a remedy.”*' When dealing with the second issue regarding
charges made against the UFCW under section 96, Cummings ruled that
Whatever might have been the point in inquiring into the union’s conduct around its 
consideration of the applicant’s petition for a second vote has now evaporated with the loss 
of the employment relationship. There is no labour relations purpose in inquiring into that 
dispute since there is no effective remedy. As counsel for the union put it, events have 
overtaken the litigation.
There is similarly, no point to inquiring into the applicants’ allegations that employees 
were intimidated and coerced in respect of the vote on the employer’s final offer. Counsel 
for the applicants conceded that once the Board removed the possibility of ordering a 
second vote, those allegations only served as a useful back drop or context to the 
allegations around the union’s response to the applicant’s petition for a second vote.**
The dismissal of the unfair labour practices application was a major set back for the petitioning
group.
Cummings nevertheless considered the application under section 87(2), alleging that the 
union had denied some of its members the opportunity to receive strike pay and benefits because 
they had attended the Safeway W orkers’ Association meeting and had filed charges against the
Ontario Labour Relations Board, Decision o f the Board. November 15, 2002, file 0766-02-U  and 2261-02-U . 
Ibid.
Ibid.
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union with the Ontario Labour Relations Board.** Cumming’s decision was a disappointment for 
the petitioning group in its efforts to get a second vote on the Final Offer. After the Ontario 
Labour Relations Board threw out the unfair labour application, Canada Safeway’s President, 
Chuck Mulvenna, no longer needed the support of the petitioning group and he became more 
elusive in his statements to the press about the future of the stores in Thunder Bay. The UFCW, 
meanwhile, viewed the Board’s decision with enthusiasm, hoping the community and its 
members would once again support the union leadership.
The United Food and Commercial Workers (UFCW) had been steadily losing support 
since Canada Safeway closed the three stores. The Thunder Bay Post’s question of the week, for 
example, asked community members whether they supported “management or the union in the 
Safeway dispute?” Their survey found that 63.9% of the 269 people who voted supported 
management, and only 20.8% supported the union, with 15.2% abstaining.*'' Criticism of the 
union likewise increased, as more community members wrote letters to the editor in the Thunder 
Bay Post and The Chronicle-Journal. Some comments particularly emphasized the loss of wages 
the workers had suffered, but not the union officials; “I am wondering if these UFCW officials 
are going to give up their salary to help the 200 ex-Safeway employees who wanted their jobs 
back to get them through this tough time ahead with the loss of their jobs or careers.” Still others 
wrote to encourage UFCW members to “apply for a job with the UFCW. Let us know if they 
care enough to give you a job to replace the one they just cost you.”** Community member 
Robert Graham expressed the fmstration felt about the strike when he wrote that
Ibid. The application under section 87(2) was initially brought forward to the board on July 8, 2002 where Mary 
Ellen Cummings concluded that the UECW had breached section 87(2). The UFCW challenged that “the applicants 
never specifically alleged that section 87(2) had been violated and it is too late, on the evening o f  the hearing, for the 
applicants to add that ground.” During the hearing Mary Ellen Cummings ruled that the application should proceed.
 ̂ “What’s your opinion,” Thunder Bay Post, June 14, 2002.
“  Ibid.
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With Safeway now delivering on its promise to close their three locations in Thunder Bay, 
will the UFCW (United Food and Commercial Workers) fulfill its promise to its 481 
members? That is to say, will the union provide for those members and their families who 
are now out of work and out of money? As well as providing for them in the short term, is 
the union going to provide for their members’ children to go to college as well as 
providing for their retirement? Simple answer to these questions is No.
He believed that the union had lost track of its primary goal -  “to keep the members working.”*®
Criticism from the community against the union sparked condemnation of the UFCW
from the editor of The Chronicle-Journal. The editor supported the petitioning group in its
efforts to secure another government-supervised vote, contending that “enough workers claimed
publicly they felt threatened by the presence of certain union members brought in from other
cities during the voting process to case serious doubt upon its veracity.... Big unions know a
thing or two about ‘persuading’ votes the way they want them to go.... If you want a chance to
return to work... sign the petition this morning.”** In another editorial, the editor remarked on
the irony of the union’s refusal to accept the petition for a second government-supervised vote
because “democracy demanded the first close vote result stand,” even after it was presented with
a petition signed by the majority of its members.** By September 2002, the editor clearly
recognized what the UFCW refused to acknowledge: “In the Safeway dispute, employees
themselves are fiercely divided between support for the vote against the company’s final offer,
and for a second vote to counter persistent claims and strong evidence that the first, close tally
did not represent the true majority will.”*® Statements made by the editor of The Chronicle
^  Letters to the Editor, “Reality of Safeway strike hits home,” The Chronicle-Journal, June 10, 2002, A7.
Editorial, “There won’t be a third time,” The Chronicle-Journal, June 12, 2002, A6.
Editorial, “A strange ending to Safeway strike,” The Chronicle-Journal, June 14, 2002, p. A6. The editor also 
made the following comment, criticizing the petitioning group; “In the end, too, the holdout em ployees made the old 
mistake o f  stooping to a foe’s level. When they claimed they feared the presence o f alleged union enforcers during 
the vote, the workers gained public sympathy in their bid to return to work after eight months on the picket line. But 
when other employees at the meeting complained o f being hounded and threatened to sign the petition, the rightness 
o f that cause suffered.”
Editorial, “Many players in this game,” The Chronicle-Journal, September 5, 2002, A6.
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Journal tended to reflect the situation on the picket line as more Safeway employees sought to 
return to work or to find alternative employment.
B: The New Deal
Aware that the tide of support had turned against the UFCW, and having settled a number 
of outstanding issues with the Ontario Labour Relations board, the union attempted to push the 
company to sell the three Thunder Bay stores. John Fuller, a UFCW representative, commented 
that “right from the company’s announcement they were closing, our position has been put them 
up for sale at a reasonable price.... We think now it’s certainly the time for the company to either 
make the decision that they’re going to re-open the stores with a proper collective agreement, or 
sell them.”®® Frustrated with the company. Fuller admitted for the first time that there was 
nothing the union could do but wait. Although the union leadership had previously claimed that 
it had had potential buyers in an effort to encourage its members to vote against the Final Offer, 
Fuller and others came up empty handed. Instead, the union decided that it would maintain the 
picket line until Safeway made a decision.®'
The New Year brought no news for the Safeway workers walking the picket lines. Efforts 
by the union leadership and Thunder Bay’s Mayor, Ken Boshcoff, to force Canada Safeway to 
sell the three stores made little headway. John Fuller continued to argue that the company should 
either sell the stores or make a deal; “very simply, our position is we’re always ready to talk to 
Safeway or any other employer about reopening negotiations.” The petitioning group remained 
mystified by the UFCW’s rejection of the petition requesting a second government-supervised 
vote. Cindy Normand, a spokeswoman for the group, expressed frustration with the situation
“  Kris Ketonen, “Safeway delay frustrates union,” The Chronicle-Journal, November 27, 2002, A3. 
Ibid.
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when she said that “it all became a game of saving face between the union and the company and
we were the pawns.” Even though the petitioning group represented more than forty percent of
the former Safeway employees, their efforts to force the company and union into negotiations
and their attempt to decertify the UFCW remained dead in the water.®*
Statements made by the UFCW leadership in the press hid the fact that negotiations
between the UFCW and Canada Safeway had begun again in late 2002. According to the
President of the UFCW, Wayne Hanley, a behind-the-scenes official from Canada Safeway made
subtle overtures to him to suggest that a resolution could be reached on the ongoing labour
dispute in Thunder Bay. According to Hanley,
At this juncture in time, our membership had accepted termination and closure and it was 
time to move on. The last thing we wanted to do was to raise false hopes for the members 
only to have them dashed again. We also didn’t want to give the dissenters any reason to 
start up again or provide an opportunity for further turmoil in the community. *
John Fuller likewise believed it was in the best interests of the union to keep the negotiations
hidden from the membership. He contended the proposal was close to the deal Local 175 had
presented to the company around the time of the Manitoba agreement. Once the company and
union resumed talks, a proposal was quickly agreed upon to bring forward to the negotiating
committee and to the members: “as quickly as Wayne could document details of the agreement, a
meeting was convened with the Bargaining Committee to bring them up to speed. The committee
was unanimous in its support of what had transpired to reach the agreement and the agreement
itself.”®'' The unanimous approval of the agreement reflected the negotiating committee’s
determination in seeking an end to the strike. They believed the proposal was the best
Ward Holland, “Mayor pressures Safeway: Boshcoff wants answer about firm’s future in city,” The Chronicle- 
Journal, January 10, 2003, A5.
Trbovich; 50.
^  Ibid. See also, Mike Stimpson, “Safeway union had deal,” The Chronicle-Journal, February 15, 2003, A l.
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opportunity for former Safeway employees to return to work. The UFCW presented the 
settlement to the membership on Sunday, February 16.
The new agreement, however, contained a number of controversial clauses which, when 
compared with the October 2001 offer, were much more detrimental to the membership. O f the 
over four hundred employees who went on strike initially in October 2001, for example, only 64 
full-time and 193 part-time employees were slated to return to work under the new agreement.®* 
The new agreement likewise eliminated meat cutters and meat wrappers with the introduction of 
counter-ready meat. It specified, as did the October proposal, that those meat cutters who were 
displaced by the contract could either opt to exercise seniority rights or receive a resignation 
allowance.®® The company also reserved the right to “limit the number of employees leaving 
from each individual department and job function,” while maintaining the power to reduce full­
time employees to part-time status if enough full-time employees did not accept the resignation 
allowance.®* The resignation allowance was similarly limited by the company in both dollar 
terms and the number of employees who were eligible to accept it.®* Perhaps the most 
controversial clause in the new collective agreement was the introduction of a new Tier Three 
part-time wage scale. Besides the implementation of lower wages, the company also specified 
that employees hired after the date of ratification were required to work on Sunday regardless of 
their availability if enough volunteers were not available.®® The new agreement nevertheless 
included a couple of proposals that were more beneficial to the employees. Canada Safeway, for 
example, maintained its early submission to provide four lump sum payments, averaging $500 or
^  Memorandum o f Settlement, presented to UFCW Local 175 membership on February 16, 2003.
“  Ibid; 6.
Ibid. Safeway Canada did agree that if  an employee elected “to become part-time and if a full time job is not 
available within 4 weeks,” then they could accept the Resignation Allowance.
Ibid; 7.
Ibid; 3.
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less, over a 36 month period.*® In addition, the company maintained its previous employee
benefits, sick leave, and vacation pay.*'
Confident that the proposal would be accepted, the union and company aimed to resume
operations as quickly as possible. To facilitate its operation, the agreement included a number of
amendments to reinstate friendly relations with all parties involved, including the petitioning
group. Section 39(G), for example, eliminated the option of members’ pursuing “any contractual
or legislative notice of reduction to part-time including but not limited to notice of termination,
termination pay and severance pay under the Employment Standards Act 2002.” A further
amendment under section 39(K) agreed that the company and union would withdraw any
applications they had filed with the Ontario Labour Relations Board and that they would not
initiate any further applications. Perhaps the most controversial clause in the opinion of the union
supporters was section 39(M) which stated that
It is further agreed that neither the Company nor the Union will take any new action 
against each other or against any employees and/or former employees for any activities 
that may have occurred during the labour dispute. The Company agrees to use its best 
efforts to have the employees withdraw any action already commenced against the union 
on account of any activity occurring during the labour dispute and if successful the union 
will not proceed with outstanding internal union charges against any member.**
Many of the union supporters believed that the union critics were getting too much out of the
deal and should be punished further. Nevertheless, their opinions were ignored and section 39(Q)
stated that the company and union agreed that there would be no recrimination against any
employees because of their participation in the strike.**
The agreement between Canada Safeway and the UFCW caught most members by
surprise. One member recalled how she first heard about the tentative deal on Valentine’s Day
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while attending a Thunder Wolves hockey game. A newspaper article in The Chronicle Journal
the following day surprised most members, but it was received with enthusiasm by all, ineluding
the petitioning group. For those members who had been working two or three jobs to support
their families, a tentative agreement seemed unreal.*' Regardless of some of the more
controversial policies, many viewed the proposal as an opportunity to end a bitter strike. Thus,
when the deal was proposed to the membership, an overwhelming ninety percent of the
membership in attendance ratified the collective agreement. The UFCW likewise claimed
victory, contending that the collective agreement “removed many of the issues that gave rise to
our members’ earlier rejection of company offers.”** Spearheading the new alliance with Canada
Safeway, the UFCW enticed its members, as agreed to in the collective agreement, to rebuild the
three Safeway stores. In a message to the membership the union wrote.
On this labour dispute our members faced the challenges that most strikers face -  but they 
stood together for 16 Vi long months, supported each other, they laughed and cried 
together, hunted for Easter eggs with their kids and union together, they performed day 
care duties together, eooked and served soup together -  and the list goes on. They faced 
much unnecessary challenge from a few within their own ranks and overcame that 
challenge from each and every direction. They showed that as dedicated and committed as 
they were to their customers before the strike -  they would and could channel that same 
dedication and commitment to winning their strike -  and they did. Now they must get on 
with their next challenge. That challenge will be to convince their former customers and 
friends to return to Safeway stores where they will see that same dedication and 
commitment rebuild Safeway’s business in Thunder.*®
Comments reflecting the dedication and solidarity of the rank and file helped bolster the
members for the challenge of re-building the customer base.
The UFCW’s message, however, was not reflective of the realities of the strike. A closer
examination of all three contracts reveals that Local 175 members received a poorer contract
than they had originally rejected in September 2001. Besides the obvious loss of jobs that
Interview 4A, 2006.74
UFCW publication to UFCW members, February, 2003. 
Ibid.
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incurred because of the strike, reducing the number of Canada Safeway employees from 
approximately 450 to 254, the company was able to introduce counter-ready meats, eliminating 
the 35 full and part-time jobs the UFCW was said to be defending in October 2001. A company 
proposal to force new employees to work on Sunday irrespective of their availability became 
another heated point of contention with the union in September 2001 but was accepted as part of 
the February 2003 contract without significant opposition. Employee grievances against the 
company complaining about the reduction in part-time hours and management disrespect 
regarding seniority rights fell to the wayside during the 16 V2 month strike. The new letter of 
understanding proposed in the September 2001 contract found its way into the February 2003 
contract, agreeing to “establish a scheduling committee that will on a regular basis (no less than 
quarterly) review work schedules with a view to making recommendations for improvement.”** 
Needless to say, the thirty cent pay increase demand was also missing from the February 2003 
contract.
While it appears that the UFCW lost most of the proposals for which it went on strike in 
October 2001, it did make some headway when compared to the May 2002 Final Offer. The 
company, for example, withdrew any attempt to reduce employee benefits, vacation or sick 
leave. The company was, however, able to introduce a Tier Three part-time workforce starting 
after the date of ratification in February 2003. The introduction of a Tier Three part-time 
workforce had been a major stumbling block during the May 2002 negotiations, but after losing 
their jobs in June 2002 it became less of an issue, as UFCW members sought to return to work. 
The company did remove some of the more controversial language surrounding the Tier Three 
part-time employees, such as its insistence that it give new tier three workers more hours than
Memorandum o f Settlement, presented to UFCW Local 175 membership on February 16, 2003, 4.
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Tier One or Tier Two part-time workers. In the end, the union was able to ensure that the only 
difference between the three tiers was the wage scale.
Since employees still had the Final Offer fresh in their minds and were disheartened by the 
stores’ closure in June 2002, any offer recommended by the UFCW seemed like a victory, even 
if it was a hollow one. Even those members of the petitioning group who had criticized the union 
from the beginning of the strike viewed the contract as a victory, since all they had wanted since 
the beginning of the strike was to return to work. Sections 39(M) and (Q) were particularly 
welcome for those UFCW members who had sided with the petitioning group, since they now 
had the option of returning to work for Canada Safeway without the possibility of losing their 
union card. Upon the ratification of the contract, most members of the petitioning group 
withdrew their applications with the Ontario Labour Relations Board under section 87(2). Only 
two applicants, Helen Drebit and Mary Humbruff, who had found other jobs in the community, 
pursued their applications. A decision of the board, presided over by Mary Ellen Cummings on 
June 9, 2003, struck down the charges “because the applicants did not attend to introduce 
evidence to which the union was required to respond.” The applicant’s lawyers, Weiler, Nelson 
and Maloney, argued that the applicants could not afford the flights or accommodations required 
to attend the meeting and asked the board to reschedule the meetings in Thunder Bay. The 
board’s decision remained the same, however, contending that “the board has made a decision to 
schedule the matter in Toronto in the interests of the Board’s overall efficiency,” leading it to 
uphold its verdict.**
For a small minority of UFCW members, the concessions agreed upon in the new contract 
were unacceptable. One member, Karen Wyder, was completely shocked and angered at the way
78 Ontario Labour Relations Board. Decision o f the Board. June 9, 2003, file 0766-02-U  and 2261-02-U.
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in which the union pushed the new contract on the membership. She was one of only a few who 
realized that
After being on strike for a year and a half ... the contract they came up with did not justify 
the means. We deserved better. There was still no guarantee for part-timers, there was 
nothing in there for the full-timers, the meat department was still going to be gone, and 
there was a lot of language in there that allowed a discretion, Safeway to have discretion to 
do this, that and the other thing.*®
As much as Karen Wyder did not agree with the new contract, she questioned why the UFCW
had rushed the contract after being on strike for a year and a half. No one in the union, however,
would answer any of her questions. She complained that the membership did not know anything
before the contract vote; as members, they were not informed about anything, it was all
hush hush until that morning when the paper said there was a meeting to vote on the new 
contract... it was very sad. Everything had been taken care of.... The people on our 
negotiating committee had not been informed until that day that we sat at the labour hall 
and there was one lady who just came off the plane and had no clue about what was going 
on.... We didn’t have time to think about it, there was people that weren’t even there, they 
were out of town, they didn’t even get to vote. After a year and a half I think every 
member had the right to vote on that contract, it could have waited a week.*®
Fortunately or unfortunately, most members did not agree with Karen Wyder. They voted to
accept the offer and return to work or accept the resignation allowance.
After a year and half of being on strike, most members just wanted to return to work and 
finally move on with their lives. Solidarity on the picket lines, having been weakened by the 
petitioning group’s efforts to secure a second government-supervised vote, first through the 
petition, and then through the decertification bid and the formation of the Safeway Workers 
Association, led to a situation where the union’s only hope for a resolution that would provide 
some vestige of victory came from Canada Safeway. Chuck Mulvenna knew that he still had an 
edge in negotiations, as his biggest bargaining chip, the stores’ closure, remained in effect.
79
Ibid.
Karen Wyder, Interview 5 A, 2006
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leading him to present an offer that provided substantial economic gains for the company, while 
providing some incentive for UFCW Local 175 members to accept the contract. The introduction 
of a Tier Three part-time work force and the company’s demand to have people work on 
Sunday’s are just two examples where the company exacted more from its employees when it 
should not have. Mulvenna’s confidence and the company’s previous success at winning gains 
against UFCW Local 175 led him to introduce only the bare minimum for employees to accept 
the new contract.
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VI: Conclusion
The Canada Safeway strike ended after a year and half, 504 days of walking the 
picket line. None of the 450 Safeway employees, nor the UFCW leadership or Safeway 
management figured that the strike would last as long as it did. It challenged all parties to 
the fullest, with some succeeding and others failing. In the end everyone lost -  some 
more than others. Some got their jobs back, but nearly half of them were forced to move 
on and find alternative employment. Previous strikes against the company in Thunder 
Bay had set a tone for the October 2001 strike. The strike in 1994, for example, was 
settled after less than a week. The union’s victory was short-lived, however, as the 
company used pressure tactics to reach a new collective agreement in 1995, which, 
although it offered jobs to those union members who were displaced because of store 
closures, nevertheless reduced the number of full-time and senior part-time employees, 
and introduced a second tier-wage scale for part-time workers. Encouraged by this 
victory, Canada Safeway saw the October 2001 strike as an opportunity to push forward 
its plan to introduce counter-ready meat. Taking a hard-line approach from the beginning, 
the company refused to offer a better contract and employed various threats to get the 
membership to support it against the UFCW.
Like Canada Safeway, the UFCW believed that a line had to be drawn in Thunder 
Bay. While fighting the company in the name of the thirty-five full and part-time meat 
department workers who were slated to lose their jobs, the UFCW leadership engaged in 
some questionable practices in order to win the members’ support. The UFCW leadership 
stated that members in Manitoba, Fort Frances, Dryden and Kenora would be on strike in 
support of the Thunder Bay members. That support did not materialize, and some
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members felt deceived. This unrealized promise undermined the UFCW’s goal of 
creating solidarity among members and in the community. Instead, it divided the 
membership into two camps: union supporters and union critics. The union also erred 
when it flew members in from different locals to encourage morale on the picket line 
leading up to the vote on the Final Offer. These militant members hindered the UFCW, as 
they attempted to intimidate union critics. The incident at the Brew Pub and the perceived 
threats the union critics felt leading into the vote on the Final Offer led to increased 
division within UFCW Local 175. The union’s poor understanding of the severance pay 
issue was another area in which the UFCW leadership appeared to mislead their 
members.
In the end, a six vote difference separating the membership clearly demonstrated 
that the UFCW did not have the solid support of members. The closure of the three stores 
in June 2002 was a signal to the UFCW that it had lost the strike; it was time to 
compromise. Arguing the democratic principle that the majority had ruled, the UFCW 
stood fast and refused to accept a petition requesting a second government-supervised 
vote, even though the petitioning group seemed to have support from the majority of 
members.
The petitioning group had few options, as its members were desperate to retain 
their jobs. The group filed the unfair labour practices application against the UFCW with 
the Ontario Labour Relations Board, sought to decertify the UFCW, and created a new 
union, the Safeway Workers’ Association, in order to compel the UFCW to accept the 
petition requesting a second government-supervised vote on the Final Offer. 
Unfortunately, the company had fired everyone on June 6, 2002, and the Ontario Labour
R eproduced  with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission.
96
Relations Board felt obliged to argue that the decertification was ineligible because no 
one was employed in the bargaining unit at the time of application.
Following the Ontario Labour Relations Boards decision on November 15, 2002, 
the UFCW and Canada Safeway re-opened negotiations. In the end, members received a 
better contract than was offered by the Final Offer in May 2002, but a worse contract 
than they rejected in September 2001. The meat department workers and others lost their 
jobs, some members lost their homes, others experienced months of emotional pain and 
suffering because of the union’s decision and the company’s high-handed actions.
The conclusion of the strike presented new difficulties both for the union and the 
company as they sought to rebuild the bonds that had been broken during the strike. For 
some members such as Karen Wyder, those bonds could never be healed, as she opted to 
take the severance package and leave the company and union behind her. Other former 
employees refuse to shop at Safeway stores any longer, because they felt betrayed by the 
company or the union. Arguably, the biggest challenge for the company has been to 
encourage its customers to return to the three Safeway stores after having closed them for 
a year and a half. Nevertheless, the Air Miles program and friendly customer service have 
led many of its former customers to forgive and forget. More recently, Canada Safeway 
has expanded its stores throughout Canada to include an updated deli and meat 
department and has added Starbucks café to stores to draw in new customers. The 
UFCW, likewise, continues to promote good relations with the company, encouraging its 
employees and members of the Thunder Bay community to shop at the three Canada 
Safeway stores.
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The Canada Safeway strike provides further insight into some of the problems the 
UFCW has contended with in opposing the labour initiatives of management, especially 
concerning part-time employees. Unlike its previous success at defending the interests of 
the skilled meat department employees, the UFCW was unable to resist the initiatives of 
management in its efforts to reduce the number of meat cutters and butchers through the 
introduction of counter-ready meat.* During the strike, the demands of the part-time and 
full-time employees led to competition and division in the UFCW as the membership 
became divided over priority issues of job protection and security for the full-time 
employees, especially in the meat department, and a guarantee of part-time hours. In 
October 2001, for example, workers voted to strike against the company because it would 
not guarantee part-time hours and planned to implement counter-ready meat which would 
eliminate thirty full and part-time positions. Despite these problems, the contract had 
provided the opportunity for meat department employees to be placed in other 
departments, suggesting that job losses could be minimized. A guarantee of part-time 
hours became a major stumbling block during the negotiations as the UFCW sought a 
guarantee of 24 hours for part-time workers and the ability for workers to transfer 
between departments to ensure they received their guaranteed hours. Canada Safeway, 
however, refused to guarantee part-time hours.
The union sought to avoid the loss of jobs in the meat department, but Manitoba 
arbitrator William Hamilton’s decision to allow Canada Safeway to implement counter­
ready meats in Manitoba removed any chance the union had of forestalling the
' In Jan Kainer’s study, she contended the “male-predominant meat cutters and butchers, who were the first 
to unionize in grocery retail, [and] because they were the most sk illed ... were thus able to exert 
considerable bargaining leverage. To this day, the meat cutters have higher wage rates and better collective 
agreement protections than other workers in the store.”, 187.
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introduction of counter-ready meat in Thunder Bay. The company refused to grant a 
contract similar to the one offered to Manitoba workers and instead sought further 
concessions from the Thunder Bay employees by reducing some of its full-time staff to 
part-time positions. The strike thus changed character as the full-time workers sought to 
end the strike to retain their full-time positions and part-time workers continued to fight 
for a guarantee of part-time hours. The UFCW leadership attempted to minimize its 
failures by taking a hard-line approach with the company and continuing to insist on a 
guarantee of part-time hours. The divisions among UFCW members resulted from the 
union’s poor leadership and from Canada Safeway’s more controversial policies that 
divided the membership.
The divisions afflicting the Thunder Bay workers during the Canada Safeway 
strike was primarily over whether it should continue the strike. The UFCW leadership felt 
it was necessary to continue the strike, while the union’s critics sought to end the strike. 
Even though the union’s critics received minimal support at the beginning of the strike, 
their cause grew in strength as the evidence continued to mount against the UFCW. The 
union’s refusal to accept a petition requesting a second government-supervised vote 
pushed even more members to support the petitioning group in its efforts to decertify the 
UFCW and to create an employers’ organization, the Safeway Workers’ Association. The 
UFCW succeeded in maintaining the bargaining rights of the Canada Safeway employees 
because the Ontario Labour Relations Board ruled that none of the employees was 
employed in the bargaining unit at the time of the application to decertify the UFCW.
Dissent in the UFCW hindered the strike, as more members complained that the 
union did not adequately represent them, even though union leaders continued to argue
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that they had the support of the membership. Conversations with individuals during the 
thesis research revealed that most members in the UFCW felt that the union failed to 
provide them with clear and accurate information about the ongoing negotiations and 
strike. Such communication would have increased the union’s likelihood of garnering 
support from the membership.
Since the 1980s, unions have been in a relatively weak position, especially in the 
retail industry, where companies have greater power and can afford to close down their 
businesses for a prolonged period. The Canada Safeway strike is just one example where 
a company could afford to close its business without significantly affecting its overall 
revenue. While the company lost money because of the strike, it also was able to cut 
down its expenditure in the long run by gaining a number of concessions, such as the 
introduction of a new Tier Three part-time wage scale. UFCW locals across the province 
were unable to engage in sympathy strikes in support of the Thunder Bay because section 
46 of the Ontario Labour Act outlaws wildcat strikes. The establishment of the Rand 
Formula prohibited strikes during the life of a collective agreement. In effect, this made 
any sympathetic strike illegal.
Faced with the realities of current economic trends towards a growing part-time 
workforce, and of unions’ difficulties in adequately representing their members, the rank- 
and-file membership needs to take a more active role in deciding the policies of the 
union. This means that employees in a bargaining unit need to attend their union 
meetings. Without being informed about union decisions, the rank-and-file risk being 
pawns in the struggle between the union leadership and company bosses. Sometimes this 
might mean the members need to support the union leadership, and at other times oppose
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them. Either way, in today’s economic climate, workers in the retail industry remain 
vulnerable.
The Canada Safeway strike challenges some of the theoretical structures 
commonly accepted in Canadian historiography. Scholars during the 1960s and 1970s 
challenged traditional approaches to history that had examined the political and 
institutional policies of unions and employers, opting instead to focus on ideas such as 
working-class consciousness, gender, regionalism, and ethnicity. These historians have 
largely neglected the recent trends in the Canadian labour movement pointing to a 
resurgence of concerns among the rank-and-file over the economic, political, and 
institutional activities of their unions and employers. While Sam Gindin and Steven High 
have demonstrated the emergence of a unique Canadian resistance culture in the 
industrial factory that allowed rank-and-file members to forge closer links with union 
leaders, their studies are not reflective of the changes in the Canadian job market that 
have seen an increase in the number of service industries, especially in the retail industry. 
Some labour historians have briefly examined the retail industry, such as Kumar and 
Ryan, Bryan Palmer, and Craig Heron. Their studies reflect the divisions afflicting the 
rank-and-file members, the rise of union bureaucracy, which has led union leaders to 
pursue an agenda at the expense of their members, and the increased rivalry between 
unions, which has led unions to take a more pro-active approach against union dissenters. 
Kumar and Ryan’s study of the labour movement, which focused on interviews with 
some of Canada’s most prominent trade union leaders during the 1980s, provides insight 
into union strategies and the agenda of union leaders during this era. Union leaders 
admitted that the rank-and-file remained unsatisfied with their union’s bargaining
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performance, whether it was a national or international union. Palmer’s study reflected a 
darker image of the contemporary labour leader. He argued that “trade union leaders in 
Canada are overwhelmingly committed to the principles of reformist politics,” focusing 
on workers as property in order to maintain union dues.^ He extends this argument, 
contending that social unionism, the supposed antithesis of business unionism, has failed 
to
stress the extent to which only mobilizations led by the working class and backed 
by the working-class capacity to stop the productive forces of advanced capitalist 
society in their tracks have the actual power to transform social relations.... All the 
while using their own powers and considerable financial and bureaucratic clout to 
control coalitions and steer them in directions the labour hierarchy can tolerate.^
Palmer’s point of view resonates clearly -  most labour leaders in the contemporary
working class movement remain concerned with their own interests. Heron similarly
remains critical of the union leadership, contending that the “story of the Canadian labour
movement, then, is one of hostility from employers and the state, but also of frequent
internal turmoil, of craft unionist against industrial unionist, of rank-and-filer against
bureaucrat, of Marxist against labourist or social democrat, of women against men.”'* Jan
Kainer’s study, examining the business unionism of the UFCW and its failure to resist the
initiatives of management at introducing new tier wages for part-time employees or
reducing full-time workers to part-time positions, demonstrates similar findings.
Unfortunately, the Canada Safeway strike shows that skilled cutters and butchers in th,
meat department who had been able to maintain their wages and full-time jobs læcause of
their skills during the mid-1990s have now joined those workers in other departments
 ̂Bryan Palmer, Working Class Experience Rethinking the History o f Canadian Labour. 1800-1991 
(Toronto; McClelland & Stewart Inc., 1992), 371.
 ̂Ibid, 372.
'* Craig Heron, The Canadia oour Movement A  Short History 2"*̂  Edition. (Toronto: James Lorimer & 
Company, Publishers, 1996), viii.
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who have suffered a reduction in hours and a loss of job opportunities because of the 
UFCW’s failure to deal with the exigencies of management’s labour initiatives.
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